Physical Security Design and The Active Shooter (Pt. 1)

Physical Security and Active Shooter Attacks

Physical Security Design and The Active Shooter (Pt. 1)

When many people think of physical security, the first ideas that come to mind are things like locks, alarm systems, screening with metal detectors, CCTV, etc.—hardware components or procedures. Although these elements play a role in physical security, they have no value outside the context of the overarching system design.

In the context of active assailant attacks, performance-based physical security design integrates Detection, Delay, and Response elements in a manner that mathematically reconciles the time required for an adversary to commence mass killing and the time required for detection and response by security or police.

Fundamentally, physical security design is a mathematics problem defined by several key times and probabilities. The main performance metric of a Physical Protection System (PPS) design is its Probability of Interruption, defined as the probability that an adversary will be detected and intercepted by a response force before he/she can complete their objective.[1] The most important elements determining the Probability of Interruption are the Adversary Task Time (total time required for an adversary to enter a facility and access their target) and response force time. If the total time for detection, assessment, communications, and response force intervention is longer than the adversary task time, the system will fail. Specific elements alone (such as having an access control system or CCTV cameras) mean nothing outside the context of the overall system design. Individual PPS elements must work together integrally to reconcile these key times or the adversary will succeed.

In the context of active shooter events, detection usually is the result of visual or audible observation when the attack commences. Detection may also result from an alarm signal generated by forced entry into secured spaces or gunshot detection systems. The Time of Detection during an attack is represented in figure 1 as T_D.

The time the report is received by authorities and/or assessed by a security control room for deployment of on-site armed officers is represented in the diagram as TA (Time of Assessment).

After the 911/112 center or security control room is alerted, the response force is subsequently dispatched to intercept and neutralize the adversary. This is represented in the following diagram as the Time of Interruption (TI).

While the alert and response force deployment is in progress, the adversary advances through barriers and distance to access targets and initiate mass killing. The time mass killing is in progress is represented in the previous diagram as Time of Completion (T_C). The Adversary Task Time is the cumulative time between the Time of Detection and the Time of Completion. If the Time of Interruption is before the Time of Completion, the Physical Protection System (PPS) is successful in its function of preventing mass killing.

In most previous active shooter attacks, deficiencies in one or more key functional elements (Detection, Delay, or Response) result in a situation where mass killing (T_C) initiates before the response force intervenes (T_I).

Based on data yielded during several studies of active shooter attacks, the consequences of the difference in time between commencement of mass killing and response force intervention (TC versus TI) can be estimated as one casualty per 15 seconds.[2]

Although the ideal objective of PPS design is to interrupt mass killing before it commences, real world conditions often limit the possibility of achieving a high Probability of Interruption. This type of situation is often common in ‘soft target’ facilities due to the need for unobstructed public access and facilities reliant on the unpredictable response times of off-site police. Other real world challenges such as cultural expectations, branding, and budget boundaries often limit the feasibility of implementing ideal physical security measures. And if an attack is launched by an insider adversary (e.g., employee, student, etc.) already inside the facility, physical protection elements at outer protective layers (e.g., perimeter, building envelope, entrances, etc.) will have little or no benefit.

Nevertheless, all measures that increase Adversary Task Time and expedite response time have a direct benefit in reducing potential casualties by narrowing the gap between TC and TI.

Sandy Hook Elementary School, 14 December 2012: Case Study of Performance-Based Physical Security Principles in Practical Application

At approximately 09:34, Adam Lanza used an AR-15 rifle to shoot through a tempered glass window adjacent to the school’s locked entrance doors and passed into the lobby.[3]

After killing the school principal and a school psychologist and injuring two other staff members who entered the hallway to investigate, Lanza entered the school office. Meanwhile, staff members concealed inside the school office and nearby rooms initiated the first calls to 911. Staff located throughout the building were alerted when the ‘all-call’ button on a telephone was accidentally activated during a 911 call.

After finding no targets in the office, Lanza returned to the hallway and proceeded into the unlocked door of first grade classroom 8 where mass murder commenced (approx. 09:36).[4] In less than two minutes, Lanza killed two teachers and fifteen students.

As the attack in classroom 8 was in progress, teacher Victoria Soto and a teaching assistant in classroom 10 attempted to conceal children in cabinets and a closet.

After exhausting targets in classroom 8, Lanza proceeded into classroom 10 and killed Ms. Soto, assistant Anne Murphy, and five children. Although the exact reason Ms. Soto did not lock the door to classroom 10 is unknown, all classrooms at Sandy Hook Elementary School featured ANSI/BHMA “classroom-function” (mortise F05 and bored F84) locks which can only be locked with a key from the hallway-side of the door.

The tragedy ended in classroom 10 when Lanza committed suicide at 09:40 while police were preparing for entry into the building.

As common in U.S. primary schools, Sandy Hook Elementary School relied on off-site police as their response force during emergency events. Response was first initiated at 09:35 when a staff member called 911 to report the crisis. At 09:36, an alert was broadcast by radio and police units were dispatched to the school. The first police unit arrived at 09:39, followed immediately by two other units. After assessing the scene and planning a point of entry, the officers organized into a contact team and made entry into the school at 09:44.

In the context of physical protection system performance, the adversary task time (time between when Lanza’s entry commenced and mass killing was in progress) at Sandy Hook Elementary School was approximately 23 seconds. The time between detection of the attack and on-site arrival of police was slightly less than three minutes. However, there was an additional 5-6 minutes of time as officers assessed the situation and organized before making entry and effectively moving indoors to neutralize the killer. When assessing incidents involving response by off-site police, arrival time at the scene is irrelevant. What matters is the time ending when police arrive at the immediate location of the adversary ready to neutralize the threat. This describes the contrast between On-Site Response Time and Effective Response Time. At Sandy Hook Elementary School, the Effective Response Time was approximately nine minutes.

As illustrated in the following table, the variation between Adversary Task Time and Effective Response Time witnessed at Sandy Hook Elementary School has been historically common during active assailant attacks. In each of the six events documented below, mass killing was in full progress within 1-3 minutes of the time the attacker entered the building or shot the first victim. By comparison, the Effective Response Times ranged between 7 and 38 minutes, with most events ending prior to intervention by police when the attacker(s) escaped or committed suicide.

Mitigating the consequences of active shooter attacks through better physical security design and integration

In the Newtown tragedy, PPS failure was largely the result of inadequate delay in relation to the time required for response by off-site police. When the attack is analyzed using Sandia’s Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) Model, the original PPS at Sandy Hook Elementary School would have had a Probability of Interruption of 0.0006 (Very Low).

In the case of Sandy Hook Elementary School, there are a number of measures that could have improved overall system performance.

Upgrade the facade with intrusion-resistant glazing. Adam Lanza entered the building by bypassing the locked entrance doors and shooting a hole through the adjacent tempered glass window. He then struck the fractured window and climbed through the breach. Tempered safety glass is generally only 4-5 times resistant to impact as annealed glass and provides minimal delay against forced intrusion. According to testing documented by Sandia National Laboratories, 0.25 inch tempered glass provides 3-9 seconds of delay against an intruder using a fire axe and the mean delay time for penetrating 1/8″ tempered glass with a hammer is 0.5 minutes.[5] However, impact testing documented by Sandia did not account for the fragility of a tempered glass specimen after first being penetrated by firearm projectile. In penetration tests Critical Intervention Services conducted of 1/4-inch tempered glass windows using several shots from a 9mm handgun to penetrate glazing prior to impact by hand, delay time was only 10 seconds.[6]

Upgrading facade glazing with the use of mechanically-attached anti-shatter film could have improved delay time at the exterior protective layer by 60-90 seconds.[7]

Construct an interior protective layer to delay access from the lobby into occupied school corridors. Once Adam Lanza breached the exterior facade into the school lobby, there were no additional barrier layers delaying access into areas occupied by students and faculty. A significant percentage of active shooter assaults by outsider adversaries originate through main entrances and progress into occupied spaces.[8] Some examples include attacks at the Riena Nightclub (2017), Pulse Nightclub (2016), Charlie Hebdo Office (2015), Inland Regional Center (2015), Colorado Springs Planned Parenthood (2015), Centre Block Parliament Bldg (2014), and US Holocaust Memorial Museum (2009).

An ideal lobby upgrade would be designed to facilitate reception of visitors while securing the interior of the school through a protective layer constructed of intrusion-resistant materials. Depending on material specifications, an interior barrier layer could have delayed Adam Lanza’s progress into the school by an additional 60-120 seconds.

Replace “classroom-function” locks on school doors with locks featuring an interior button or thumbturn. All classroom doors inside Sandy Hook Elementary were equipped with ANSI “classroom-function” locks (mortise F05 and bored F84). These are perhaps the worst choice of locks possible for lockdown purposes during active shooter events. As witnessed in a number of attacks, doors equipped with classroom-function locks often remain unlocked due to difficulty locating or manipulating keys under stress. In addition to Sandy Hook classroom 10, another incident where this situation clearly contributed to unnecessary casualties was the 2007 Virginia Tech Norris Hall attack.[9] In these two events alone, 26 students and faculty were killed and 24 wounded specifically because the doors to classrooms could not be reliably secured.

Ideal specifications for door locks would be ANSI/BHMA A156 Grade 1 with an ANSI lock code of F04 or F82.[10] Mechanical locks rated ANSI/BHMA Grade 1 have been successfully evaluated under a variety of static force and torque tests. Locks coded as F04 and F82 feature buttons or thumbturns to facilitate ease of locking under stress.

Although there are no empirical sources citing tested forced entry times against ANSI/BHMA A156 Grade 1 rated locks, it is estimated that a committed adversary using impact force with no additional tools could penetrate improved locks in approximately 90-110 seconds.

Replace door vision panels with intrusion-resistant glazing. During the attack at Sandy Hook Elementary, Adam Lanza was able to enter classrooms 8 and 10 directly through unlocked doors. If these classrooms were secured, the tempered glass vision panels on all classroom doors could have been easily breached to facilitate entry in less than 10 seconds.

An effective approach to physical security specification would ensure that all barriers composing the classroom protective layer are composed of materials with similar delay time values. This could be accomplished by ensuring that vision panels are no wider than 1.5″ (3.8 cm) or constructed of intrusion-resistant glazing such as laminated glass, polycarbonate, or reinforced with anti-shatter film.

If the aforementioned barrier improvements were employed in the PPS design at Sandy Hook Elementary School, Adam Lanza’s access into occupied classrooms would have been delayed by an additional 162-312 seconds. This would have improved the overall performance of the PPS by potentially increasing the Adversary Task Time to 185-335 seconds before mass killing was in progress. Although this is a significant improvement from the original Adversary Task Time (est. 23 seconds), 335 seconds is still less than the estimated response time of police during the original event (est. 544 seconds).

In many cases, accomplishing the performance-based objective of interrupting an active shooter before mass killing commences requires a combined approach aimed at both increasing delay time and decreasing response force time. In the case of Sandy Hook Elementary School, decreased response time could have been facilitated by the use of gunshot detection technology or duress alarms, improved communications procedures, and similar improvements. Any measure that decreases alert notification and response times has a beneficial impact on system performance. Even if enhancements only reduce response time by 10 or 15 seconds, such improvements have the theoretical benefit of reducing casualties by one victim per fifteen seconds of decreased response time.

In the situation of Sandy Hook Elementary School, the greatest improvement could have resulted from having an on-site response force (e.g., armed school resource officer) capable of reliably responding anywhere on the school campus within 120 seconds of alert.[11] If this measure were implemented, the total estimated alert and response time could have been improved to 147-157 seconds. When compared to the increased Adversary Task Time of 206-316 seconds, the improved PPS design would have likely resulted in interruption before mass homicide commenced. When analyzed using Sandia’s Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) Model, the improved PPS would have resulted in a Probability of Interruption of 0.87 (Very High).

The following table and spreadsheet models the PPS improvements described in this article to demonstrate how performance-based physical security design can influence the outcome of armed attacks.

Threat Characteristics and Physical Security Performance

The delay time expectations of physical barriers cited in this article were based on the weaponry and methods of entry employed by Adam Lanza at Sandy Hook Elementary School. If Lanza had employed different tools or methods, the delay time of barriers would have correspondingly been different. The same principle is true for bullet-resistant barriers. The ballistic resistance of materials is directly relative to the caliber and type of ammunition used by an adversary.

To ensure a security design performs as expected, it is first necessary to establish a definition of the adversary’s likely capabilities and tactics. In Part 2 of this series, we’ll continue this discussion by exploring trends in the behavior of attackers, threat capabilities and methods, and approaches to developing a Design Basis Threat (DBT) suitable for security planning.

Endnotes

[1] Garcia, Mary Lynn. Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007.

[2] Anklam, Charles, Adam Kirby, Filipo Sharevski, and J. Eric Dietz. “Mitigating Active Shooter Impact: Analysis for Policy Options Based on Agent/computer-based Modeling.” Journal of Emergency Management 13.3 (2014): 201-16.

[3] Sedensky, Stephen J. Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012. Danbury, Ct.: Office of the State’s Attorney. Judicial District of Danbury, 2013. Print.

[4] Time estimated based on witness event descriptions and assessment of time required to walk through the school office and down the corridor to classroom 8.

[5] Barrier Technology Handbook, SAND77-0777. Sandia Laboratories, 1978.

[6] Critical Intervention Services assisted a window film manufacturer in 2015 in conducting a series of timed penetration tests of 1/4-inch tempered glass windows with mechanically-attached 11 mil window film. The tests involved penetration by firearm followed by impact (kicking and rifle buttstock). The delay times ranged from 62 to 94 seconds and deviated according to the aggression of our penetration tester.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Gundry, Craig S. “Analysis of 20 Marauding Terrorist Firearm Attacks.” Preparing for Active Shooter Events. ASIS Europe 2017, 30 Mar. 2017, Milan, Italy.

[9] Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech. April 16, 2007. Report of the Review Panel. Virginia Tech Review Panel. August 2007. pp.13.

[10] ANSI/BHMA A156.13, Mortise Locks and Latches. Builders Hardware Manufacturers Association (BHMA), New York, NY, 2011.

[11] CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® standards define a performance benchmark of 120 seconds as the maximum time for acceptable response by on-site officers. However, achieving this type of response time in many facilities requires careful consideration of facility geography, communications systems, access obstructions, and officer capabilities (e.g., training, physical conditioning, etc.).

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.

CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist organizations in managing risks of active shooter violence.
Contact us for more information.

March 17, 2020August 14, 2020

Facility Preparation and The Active Shooter Threat (Main Article)

Comprehensive risk management programs employ a multi-layered approach to reducing the risk of active shooter violence. Issues such as threat recognition and assessment, reinforcement of positive workplace/school climate and culture, suspicious activity recognition and reporting, emergency planning, and employee training all contribute to reducing the risk of active shooter attacks. However, if measures employed to prevent attacks are unsuccessful or an outsider targets the facility in a manner that evades our proactive influence, physical security and infrastructure readiness are crucial factors influencing the consequences of the event.

In recent years, much has been published focused on managing risks of active shooter violence through preventive approaches and response training. Organizations such as the US Department of Homeland Security, ASIS International, and the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals offer a wealth of information to assist in developing threat assessment and management programs and training employees in active assailant response.

Unfortunately, far less attention has been devoted to equally important matters of building design and physical security. Withstanding a handful of essays and school-related publications, there is little guidance in print about designing and preparing facilities for active shooter violence. Further, most guides that have explored this subject to date have been basic and tend to overlook important vulnerability issues and technical details.

The following collection of articles aims to address this situation and serve as a comprehensive design guide and technical reference for architects, building managers, and security professionals. The essays in this series were originally prepared for a book I have been writing for the past few years. Although I will probably submit the final body of work for print when everything is complete, we have decided to publicly release what has been written thus far in hope of filling the gap in current literature.

Protective Design Concepts

Parts 1-4 of this series provide an overview of protective strategy for reducing active shooter risk, principles of performance-based physical security, and practical issues that should be considered during the design process.

Universal Protective Measures

Parts 5-14 of the series address specific preparation matters applicable to most facilities including topics such as secure entry control, safe rooms, egress design, and emergency communications infrastructure.

1. 1. Outdoor Protective Measures
  2. Building Envelope & Entrance Design
  3. Entry Control Screening
  4. Access Control Systems
  5. Safe Rooms
  6. Egress Design
  7. Attack Detection Systems
  8. Emergency Communications Infrastructure
  9. Armed Response Officers
  10. CCTV and Control Rooms

Technical References

Throughout this series, references are made to various standards for hardware specification and barrier construction. The following articles are provided as a technical reference to assist architects, engineers, and security professionals in interpreting these standards and/or evaluating the vulnerability of existing security barriers.

A. Forced Entry Standards
B. Ballistic Protection Standards
C. Protective Barrier Materials & Construction

Craig Gundry

CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist organizations in managing risks of active shooter violence.
Contact us for more information.

February 15, 2019June 29, 2021

Risk Management & Workplace Violence

February 15, 2019

Risk Management & Workplace Violence

By Craig S. Gundry, PSP, cATO, CHS-III

Workplace Violence: The Risk in Perspective

By comparison to many other security risks, workplace violence incidents are low-moderate frequency events and rarely result in lethal consequences. According to US labor statistics, workplace violence is only responsible for 18% of deaths in professional office and healthcare settings—less than transportation accidents or even slips and falls.[i] Nevertheless, nearly 2 million American workers report having been victims of workplace violence each year.[ii] For reasons of liability, productivity, and duty of care, it is important that all employers implement reasonable measures to mitigate the probability and impact of workplace violence incidents.

Most incidents of workplace violence are examples of impromptu violence, spontaneous and unplanned acts of aggression often happening in the heat of the moment.[iii] These types of incidents can range from verbal threats and oral abuse all the way up the continuum of aggression to physical assault and non-premeditated murder.

Of greatest concern from a risk management perspective are acts of intended violence (also referred to as ‘targeted aggression’) which result in a planned, premeditated act.[iv] Most acts of mass homicide in workplace environments are examples of targeted violence and result from progression on a ‘pathway’ of development over time.

Mass Homicide in the Workplace

Many individuals who perpetrate mass violence align with Dr. Park Dietz’s definition of a Pseudocommando.[v] Pseudocommandos often evolve from angry, narcissistic personalities and harbor perceived injustices as a grievance for revenge. Violent fantasies become a refuge for the pseudocommando’s damaged ego and provide a sense of power and control.[vi] Without intervention, this process may continue into obsession and escalate until violent fantasy becomes a template for action. If this pathway progression continues unabated until nihilism takes place, commitment to violence is affirmed and often commenced in a planned manner or initiated by a trigger event (e.g., termination, demotion, family crisis, etc.).[vii]

By contrast to other security threats and even incidents of impromptu violence, acts of mass homicide are extremely low in frequency and rarely does probability as a sole factor justify risk reduction. In most cases, it’s the potentially devastating consequences of an attack that warrant concern. Aside from the obvious and horrific impact of loss of life, active assailant attacks universally result in extended disruption of facility operations, loss due to reduced productivity, and diversion of leadership attention to crisis management. The duration of operational disruption can span months before police release the facility as a crime scene, cleanup and remediation are completed, and post-incident recovery activities have concluded.

In cases where the horror of the event is deeply imprinted into the psyche of the public, the facility may be deemed permanently inhabitable due to its presence as a reminder of the tragedy. Rather than repair and restore Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newtown Public Schools opted to demolish the building and build a new replacement school at an estimated cost of $50M.[viii] Similarly, Florida’s Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act authorized $25 million to replace building 12 in Parkland, Florida. In the aftermath of the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting, the owner decided to permanently close the business as a nightclub and rebuild the site as a memorial and museum.

Depending on the organization’s responsiveness in managing the post-incident psychological consequences, the effects of an attack can easily result in an exodus of employees and long-term negative impact on workplace culture. In addition to psychological wounds suffered by victims of attacks, the trauma of mass violence can extend far beyond the local community with measurable effects of sadness and anxiety experienced vicariously by people nationwide.[ix]

When all risk factors are assessed in context, it is often the combined results of duty of care obligation (i.e., legal and moral responsibility for occupant safety), community perceptions and expectations, and the potentially catastrophic consequences of an event that warrant a balanced and diligent approach to risk control.

Risk Management Strategy and Workplace Violence

Effective risk management programs employ a multi-layered approach to controlling risk by reducing both the Probability and Criticality of events.

In the context of security risk management, risk probability is the result of Threat (an adversary with intent and capability to cause harm) and Vulnerability (the state of conditions that would allow the adversary to succeed in causing the risk event). Proactive measures aim to reduce Risk Probability by either reducing Threat or reducing Vulnerability. If proactive measures are implemented effectively, they may be successful in reducing Risk Probability, but there is always an element of uncertainty. To further reduce risk, reactive/mitigative measures should be employed to reduce the harmful effect of risk events (Risk Criticality).

In protective design theory, this concept of employing multiple layers of proactive and mitigative measures aimed at risk reduction is often described as concentric rings of protection. The following diagram illustrates this concept as it relates to workplace violence. The outermost rings of the diagram (colored in blue) represent proactive measures aimed at reducing risk probability. This is then followed by inner rings (red) representing mitigative measures aimed at decreasing the impact of events.

Workplace Violence Prevention (Proactive Measures)

Proactive risk management starts with reducing potential Threat. As a first step, measures should be employed where feasible to reduce the likely presence of violent perpetrators. One example is subjecting applicants to criminal record checks and carefully screening candidates for indications of previous behavioral problems. Next, measures should be employed to reduce potential conditions that contribute to the formation of violent intent or progression on the pathway of targeted violence. Measures such as reinforcement of positive workplace culture, providing access to employee assistance programs, and using management practices that reinforce employee dignity all contribute to reducing potential threat.

Other threat reduction measures aimed at reducing the likelihood of violence by nonemployees (e.g., angry customers, criminals, etc.) include training personnel in conflict de-escalation, ‘do-not-admit’ and trespass of threatening patrons, and presence of visible security measures as a deterrent to aggressive behavior.

To address the possibility of a dangerous employee already within our midst, threat assessment and management is our next line of defense. Extensive research over the past 25 years has established that most acts of targeted aggression by employees are precipitated by behaviors that if recognized and properly assessed can warn of potential violence and provide opportunity for intervention. Effective implementation of threat assessment and management as a protective strategy requires establishing a system for investigating and assessing threats, training supervisors to identify behaviors of concern, and managing potentially threatening situations before they result in violence.

If an employee of concern is terminated, procedures should be employed to ensure the safety of staff and best alleviate potential grievance. Some examples of safety measures include conducting the termination in a manner that preserves the individual’s dignity, scheduling terminations in the late afternoon, having security nearby, and avoiding early warning or breaks which provide an opportunity for retrieving a weapon. If concerns are substantial, additional measures may be justified such as severance pay or surveillance over the following weeks to monitor the ex-employee’s behavior and warn/intervene if the individual travels to the facility without an appointment.

Consequence Management and Workplace Violence

The aforementioned measures are often effective in reducing the probability of violence. But if measures employed to prevent attacks are unsuccessful or someone targets the facility in a manner that evades our proactive influence, physical security becomes the next line of defense. In the case of a convenience store, this may simply mean the installation of bullet-resistant glazing at the checkout counter. For organizations at risk of active assailant attacks, effective physical security is paramount in reducing the overall consequences of the event.

For best performance, physical security design should integrate Detection, Delay, and Response elements in a manner that mathematically reconciles the time required for an attacker to commence mass killing and the time required for detection and response by security or police.

If an event does occur, additional measures should be implemented to mitigate the impact of the risk event. This includes items such as early event detection and alert communications, emergency response plans and employee training, effective provisions for egress/escape, availability of safe refuge rooms, and the expedited response of armed security or police officers capable of effectively neutralizing an attacker before he/she can cause mass casualties.

Risk Management and Adversary Applicability

Obviously, not all risk reduction measures are equally applicable to all situations. Measures that may be necessary and justified in an office environment are often quite different from those in settings such as retail stores or hospitals. Risk management strategy should focus on relevant workplace violence risks in a manner that satisfies the organization’s risk appetite while tending matters of operational needs, culture, branding, and budget.

Below is a table describing the general relevance of measures in reducing different types of workplace violence risks using the FBI’s four-category classification system:.[x]

- Type I – Violent acts by criminals who have no other connection with the workplace, but enter to commit robbery or another crime.
- Type II – Violence directed at employees by customers, clients, patients, students, inmates, or any others for whom an organization provides services.
- Type III – Violence against coworkers, supervisors, or managers by a present or former employee.
- Type IV – Violence committed in the workplace by someone who doesn’t work there, but has a personal relationship with an employee—an abusive spouse or domestic partner.

ANSI/ASIS Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention Standard as a Guide for Best Practices

For those seeking to develop or improve a workplace violence prevention program, the newly updated ASIS/ANSI Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention Standard is a great place to start. The ASIS/ANSI standard (formerly ASIS/SHRM WVP.1-2011) “provides an overview of policies, processes, and protocols that organizations can adopt to help identify, assess, respond to and mitigate threatening or intimidating behavior and violence affecting the workplace.”[xi]

The measures outlined in the standard are largely universal and can be adapted to organizations of almost any size. Some of the items addressed include the role and responsibilities of stakeholders, needs assessment, elements of policy, threat assessment and management practices, critical incident planning, employee training, and more.

In early 2020, a multi-disciplinary committee of experts completed a two-year review and revision of ASIS/SHRM WVP.1-2011 including the addition of a new Active Assailant Annex. In an upcoming article, we’ll explore some of the key measures outlined in the standard and differences between the updated document and the previous edition.

Craig Gundry

CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist organizations in managing risks of workplace aggression and active shooter violence. Contact us for more information.

References

[i] Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI). Bureau of Labor Statistics. N.p. 2015. | Cited percentage of 18% is derived from analysis of 2015 workplace fatalities for NAICS categories Health care and social assistance, Professional and business services, and Professional and technical services

[ii] Workplace Violence Overview. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. US Department of Labor. N.p. https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/. Accessed 25 October 2017.

[iii] Calhoun, Fredrick, and Weston, Stephen. Threat Assessment and Management Strategies: Identifying the Hunters and the Howlers. CRC Press. Boca Raton, FL. 2016. pp 25.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Dietz, Park D. “Mass, Serial, and Sensational Homicides.” Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine. 62:49-91. 1986.

[vi] Meloy, J. Reid, and Hoffman, Jens. International Handbook of Threat Assessment. Oxford University Press. New York, NY. 2014.

[vii] Knoll, James. L. “The “Pseudocommando” Mass Murderer: Part II, The Language of Revenge.” The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. 38:263–72, 2010

[viii] Delgadillo, Natalie. With Shootings on the Rise, Schools Turn to ‘Active Shooter’ Insurance. http://www.governing.com/topics/education/gov-cost-of-active-shooters-insurance.html. June 2018.

[ix] Dore, B., Ort, L., Braverman, O., & Ochsner, K. N. (2015). Sadness shifts to anxiety over time and distance from the national tragedy in Newtown, Connecticut. Psychological Science, 26(4), 363–373.

[X] Workplace Violence. Issues in Response. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. N.d.

[xi] ASIS/SHRM WVP.1-2011, Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention. 2011.

March 7, 2017May 4, 2020

Security Officer Posting and Active Shooter Attacks

Security Officers and Active Shooter Attacks

By Craig S. Gundry, PSP, cATO, CHS-III

Few would debate that one of the most important factors in mitigating active shooter attacks is the speed in which response forces (police or armed security personnel) intercept and neutralize the adversary. The importance of response time is well supported in studies, such as Purdue University’s 2014 Mitigating Active Shooter Impact Study,[1] and case analysis of incidents using the basic mathematical principles of physical security design. The true performance measure of any Physical Protection System (PPS) is its Probability of Effectiveness, most simply described as the probability of a response force intercepting an adversary (Probability of Interruption) and stopping the intruder before the adversary can complete his objective (Probability of Neutralization). [2] Although there are many factors contributing to the Probability of Interruption, the success of a protective design ultimately hinges on Adversary Task Time in relation to Response Force Time.

Recognizing the importance of rapid intervention, many organizations in recent years have opted for contracting or assigning armed security or police on-site to serve a dual role as deterrent and response force in the event of an active shooter incident.

Although having an on-site response capability offers great potential to mitigate the consequences of an armed attack, the manner in which security or police are employed is critical if they are expected to perform their function reliably when needed. As a consultant working with many clients the past decade that have adopted the use of armed security or police personnel for this purpose, one of the most common problems I observe consistently is the assignment of officers without proper consideration for tactical reaction time. Where this concern emerges most frequently is in situations where a facility has a small sized armed security force and has assigned critical officers to stationary posts near entrances without additional control measures.

The vulnerability of posting critical response officers near entrances is illustrated by a number of attacks over the past few decades where armed officers were shot by surprise or unable to react effectively quickly enough to stop the attacker from entry. As a few examples:

- In the early morning of 01 January 2017, gunman Abdulkadir Masharipov killed 39 people and wounded 70 others at the Reina Nightclub in Istanbul. Although public details about the event are limited as of date, reports claim the attack was initiated when Masharipov shot a former police officer, Fatih Cakmak, and bystander outside the entrance. News reports indicate two other security officers, Hatice Karcilar and Burak Yildiz, also were killed during the attack but little information is available currently about whether the two officers were armed or what their response was during the incident.[3][4]
- During the June 2016 attack at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, a contracted off-duty police officer, Adam Gruler, was posted inside the club when Omar Mateen entered and opened fire on patrons. Gruler engaged Mateen but was reportedly outgunned and driven to retreat which allowed Mateen to bypass Gruler’s position and enter deeper into the club.[5] Altogether, 49 patrons were killed and 53 wounded before police made entry and neutralized the killer.
- During the May 2003 Al-Qaida attack at the Dorrat Al-Jedawal residential compound in Riyadh, a Royal Saudi Air Force guard and unarmed security officer were killed by surprise when they approached the terrorists’ vehicle as it pulled into the north-side entry gate. [6] With the only armed officer at the entry control point killed, the remaining unarmed security force was forced to flee for their survival.

In each of the above cases, security personnel did not have ample opportunity to recognize an attack was underway and react effectively before being killed or overwhelmed due to tactical disadvantage.

Security officers assigned to protecting facilities against armed assaults require a theoretical minimum of two seconds to perceive and initiate a tactical response effectively. According to studies of human reaction time, it requires approximately .20 to .30 seconds for a person to recognize a situation visually and mentally process a reaction.[7] It then requires approximately 1.7 seconds to draw a weapon from holster, aim, and fire.[8] It is also important to consider the level of awareness of the officer assigned to a security post. The two-second theoretical response time as described assumes optimal conditions and is based on research where test subjects were in a heightened state of arousal and anticipating a provocative stimulus. To describe this by using Jeff Cooper’s color codes of awareness, officers participating in research tests and firearms drills usually are in Condition Orange (specific alert). [9] In the real world when an officer is assigned at a post for extended periods without any threat to arouse awareness, the officer is most likely in Condition Yellow (relaxed alert) or possibly even Condition White (unaware). If we add to this situation additional distractions common at entry control points such access control activities and discussion with building entrants, reaction time to an armed threat could be notably longer than two seconds. An officer seated in a chair would be at even greater disadvantage.

Several options exist to approach this problem in security planning.

The most ideal option is to augment officers assigned at entry points with additional armed officers located inside more tactically advantageous locations to serve as the reliable response force if an attack occurs. In the June 2009 attack at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, James von Brunn shot Special Police Officer Stephen Johns as Johns was opening the door for him.[10] Other armed officers posted nearby were able to respond and neutralize von Brunn before he was able to pass the lobby.

Many organizations do not have the budget for more than one armed officer. In this situation, ensuring a reliable response by a lone officer requires posting him in a location that will provide two seconds or more of reaction time. If a single armed officer was posted previously in a vulnerable location near an entrance, it may be more prudent to reposition that officer in the building interior and away from entrance doors. This suggestion is often resisted when first proposed to clients that believe the armed officer is a useful deterrent when posted visibly near an entrance. It is true that perceived vulnerability is a common factor contributing to terrorist target selection, but the deterrence value of armed officers at entry control points likely is overestimated considering the frequency of attacks against facilities visibly protected by armed personnel. Although attacks have occurred where adversaries altered their plan once in execution due to newly perceived resistance at entry points (e.g., 2015 attack at the Krudttønden Cultural Centre in Copenhagen, 2015 Stade de France, etc.), we are not aware of many events where adversaries abandoned their attack intentions specifically because of the presence of armed officers at entrances.

Deterrence resulting from presence of easily observed security elements is often effective in preventing criminal actions. But when dealing with active shooters (terrorists and non-ideological perpetrators), we should assume that attack preparation will involve a more sophisticated assessment of our vulnerabilities. When securing a facility against a committed and often highly-capable adversary, deterrence as a system design goal should be regarded as the byproduct of an effective performance-based protective system.

In addition to choosing post locations that provide effective response time, armed personnel responsible for defense at entry control points should be provided with pre-positioned cover in the event of a force engagement. Cover is simply defined as an object that will shield an individual from firearm projectiles. What defines cover is determined by the adversary’s weapon system and the ballistic resistance of the object’s material and construction. In building lobbies, for example, cover for stationary security posts can be facilitated discreetly by the use of planters, bullet-resistant trash receptacles, half-walls, or security desks constructed of bullet-resistant materials. Some examples of materials appropriate for use as cover against military small arms include:

- - UL 752 rated glazing and wall construction panels[11]
  - EN 1063 rated glazing and wall construction panels[12]
  - ASTM F 1233-98 rated glazing[13]
  - NIJ 0108.01 rated materials[14]
  - Reinforced Concrete, 4″ or more[15]
  - Brick Masonry, 8″ or more[16]
  - Mild Steel Plate, 14mm[17]
  - Armor Steel Plate, 11mm[18]

To further mitigate risks at building entry control points, open entrances and public lobbies ideally should be protected by an inner layer of intrusion-resistant barriers to delay adversaries regardless of the presence of armed officers. Even a large group of security personnel in proximity of an entrance doesn’t guarantee reliable interception. Speed and surprise provide the attacker with a huge advantage in these events. This point was demonstrated in the 2014 attack at Parliament Hill in Ottowa. After wounding an unarmed officer at the Centre Block building entrance doors, gunman Michael Zehaf-Bibeau was shot by another officer located nearby and was able to run successfully through the Rotunda and Hall of Honour corridor past two rooms occupied by members of Parliament before being contained and neutralized.[19] Had the entrance design at the Centre Block building employed a secure layer of full-height intrusion resistant barriers (e.g., walls, lexan turnstiles, etc.), it is not likely Zehaf-Bibeau would have made it past the lobby.

Craig Gundry

CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist organizations in managing risks of active shooter violence. Contact us for more information.

References

1] Anklam, Charles , Adam Kirby, Filipo Sharevski, and J. Eric Dietz. “Mitigating active shooter impact: Analysis for policy options based on agent/computer-based modeling.” Journal of Emergency Management 13.3 (2015): 201-16. Web. 6 Mar. 2017.

[2] Garcia, Mary Lynn. Vulnerability Assessment of Physical Protection Systems. N.p.: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006. Print.

[3] O’Brien, Zoie. “First images of Turkey nightclub attack victims as police officer and student identified.” Express.co.uk. Express.co.uk, 02 Jan. 2017. Web. 06 Mar. 2017. <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/749239/Reina-club-terror-ISIS-victims-police-officer-student-banker-daughter-Turkey-Istanbul>.

[4] Michael, Tom, and Jon Lockett. “Families weep for dead as identities of Istanbul nightclub attack victims emerge.” The Sun. The Sun, 02 Jan. 2017. Web. 06 Mar. 2017. <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2514430/families-dead-identities-istanbul-nightclub-attack-victims/>.

[5] Harris, David. “Cops give harrowing account of rescues during nightclub shooting.” OrlandoSentinel.com. N.p., 14 June 2016. Web. 06 Mar. 2017. <http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/pulse-orlando-nightclub-shooting/os-orlando-shooting-inside-club-20160613-story.html>.

[6] Braden, Wallace. “Attack at Jedawal: Critical Lessons for AT Professionals.” 2005. S2 Online Academy. Web. 2005. | AUTHOR’S NOTE: Surprise assault against entry control point guards was a common and successful modus operandi in AQAP attacks inside Saudi Arabia throughout the early-mid 2000’s. Some other noteworthy examples include attacks at the Vinnell Corporation compound (May 2003), Al-Muhaya compound (November 2003), and the Al-Abqaiq oil processing facility (February 2006).

[7] Welchman, Andrew E., James Stanley, Malte R. Schomers, R. Chris Miall, and Heinrich H. Bülthoff. “The quick and the dead: when reaction beats intention.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences. The Royal Society, 03 Feb. 2010. Web. 06 Mar. 2017.

[8] “Edged Weapon Defense: Is or was the 21-foot rule valid? (Part 1).” PoliceOne. N.p., 23 May 2005. Web. 06 Mar. 2017. <https://www.policeone.com/edged-weapons/articles/102828-Edged-Weapon-Defense-Is-or-was-the-21-foot-rule-valid-Part-1>. | AUTHOR’S NOTE: The 1.7 second time cited by PoliceOne for drawing and aimed fire is also very consistent with the experience of the S2 Institute’s firearms training team during timed tactical handgun drills.

[9] “Cooper’s colors: A simple system for situational awareness.” PoliceOne. N.p., 09 Aug. 2010. Web. 06 Mar. 2017. <https://www.policeone.com/police-trainers/articles/2188253-Coopers-colors-A-simple-system-for-situational-awareness/>

[10] Ruane, Michael E. , Paul Duggan, and Clarence Williams. “At a Monument of Sorrow, A Burst of Deadly Violence.” The Washington Post. WP Company, 11 June 2009. Web. 06 Mar. 2017. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/10/AR2009061001768.html?hpid=topnews>.

[11] For protection against military small arms, optimal specifications would be UL 752 Level 7 (five impacts, 5.56x45mm) or Level 8 (five impacts, 7.62x51mm)

[12] For protection against military small arms, optimal specifications would be EN 1063 BR5 (three impacts, 5.56x45mm), BR6 (three impacts, 7.62x51mm soft core ammunition), and BR7 (three impacts, 7.62x51mm hard core ammunition). Although EN 1063 does not specifically encompass 7.62x39mm (AK47) ammunition, most manufacturers of EN 1063 rated materials claim the EN 1063 BR5 level is effective for protection against 7.62x39mm soft core ammunition.

[13] ASTM F 1233 establishes test procedures for the evaluation of the resistance of security glazing materials and systems against several types of threats: ballistic impact, blunt tool impacts, sharp tool impacts, thermal stress, and chemical deterioration. For purposes as ballistic cover against military small arms, ideal material specifications under ASTM F 1233 would specify Class/Level R3 equating to successful ballistic testing against .308 Winchester (7.62mm, M80 Ball).

[14] The NIJ 0108.01 standard is applicable to all ballistic resistant materials (armor) intended to provide protection against gunfire. Optimal specifications for protection against military small arms would be Level III (7.62mm FMJ) and Level IV (7.62mm AP).

[15] Unified Facilities Criteria. Design to Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects. UFC 4-023-07. U.S. Department of Defense. 7 July 2008. pp. 5-8. | AUTHOR’s NOTE: Construction specifications as described in the article text are for a ‘MEDIUM’ threat level (7.62mm NATO) as defined in UFC 4-023-07.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] O’Malley, Kady, and Hannah Thibedeau. “Ottawa shooter’s movements tracked in security video as questions remain.” CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, 24 Oct. 2014. Web. 06 Mar. 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ottawa-shooting-gunman-s-movements-caught-on-video-but-security-questions-remain-1.2810673>.

Category: Workplace Violence & Active Shooter Risk Mgmt