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Public Awareness and the War on Terrorism

By Craig Gundry and K.C. Poulin
 
Since the attacks of September 11th, a number of bulletins have been issued by the FBI warning of an increased potential for terrorist attacks. In many cases, these warnings are vague and unspecific—the result of fragmented or unverified information filtering in from the intelligence community. Yet in these alerts, the public is warned to be on the watch for “suspicious activity” and to maintain a “heightened state of alert.” Without specific guidance, these types of warnings have created a state of confusion and frustration by the public and local authorities who, until recently, have never confronted the threat of terrorism.
 
So what can the public do to aid in the War on Terrorism? What should citizens and local police be looking for with regard to “suspicious activity?” Addressing these questions requires an understanding of how Al-Qaida and other affiliated threat groups operate and how terrorist attacks are planned and executed. By assessing the terrorist’s modus operandi, we can identify many observable activities or events that can indicate a potential terrorist attack. In the anti-terrorism community, these types of observable activities are referred to as “threat indicators.” Any notice of these activities should be reported to police and promptly investigated.
 
Threat Indicators
 
When many people think of suspicious activity, they tend to think of suspicious looking men entering and leaving an apartment at unusual hours or overhearing words like “bomb” or “anthrax” in a suspicious conversation. These types of public sightings have, on a number of occasions, led authorities to uncovering terrorist plots. However, there are many other types of activities or circumstances that can suggest the potential for a terrorist attack. Most of these indicators relate to the terrorist’s gathering of target intelligence, the acquisition of materials necessary for an attack, preparation of bombs or chemical/biological weapons, and the first steps of executing an attack (bomb delivery, gaining access to a plane, etc.).
 
All terrorist operations are preceded by a process of intelligence gathering. This often involves conducting reconnaissance visits or stationary surveillance of a target for weeks or even months. Citizens are often in an excellent position to recognize threat indicators associated with target surveillance. For example, a waitress in a diner may notice that two men who come in every morning always request a seat by a certain window. The same two men stay for a long time and seem more interested in activity outside of the window than talking. Whenever they do talk, they become quiet when someone approaches their table or the men quickly change their topic of discussion. This type of activity should be regarded as highly suspicious (especially if the window provides a view of an ideal terrorist target, such as a government building, shopping mall, or symbolic commercial building). People who loiter for very long periods of time, people who seem to take strong interest in a particular facility or building, or anyone who seems self-conscious or nervous while photographing or videotaping a location should be regarded as suspicious.
 
Citizens who work in locations that sell or store possible bomb making materials or items that can be used in manufacturing chemical or biological weapons should be aware of suspicious purchases or thefts. Many items commonly used in making bombs or chemical weapons are openly sold in hardware stores, pharmacies, garden stores, hobby shops, and electronics stores. For example, hardware clerks should be aware of anyone purchasing threaded pipes and end caps, gas canisters, large quantities of pesticides, ammonia nitrate fertilizers, etc. Employees in drug stores should be suspicious of anyone purchasing unusual quantities of isopropanol or DMSO. Pharmacists should also note suspicious inquiries or thefts of antibiotics, atropine, fentanyl medications, or other drugs used as chemical agent precursors or used to treat chemical or biological agent exposure. To recognize suspicious purchases and thefts, citizens need to know what items are located in their workplace that have value in terrorist applications.
 
The public should also be aware of threat indicators related to the preparation and delivery of terrorist weapons. For example, many terrorist groups acquire vehicles for bomb attacks by theft or rental. As a result, people who work for vehicle rental companies should be aware of anyone renting a utility van or truck that appears vague or suspicious about its purpose. Additionally, police and the public should be aware of any unusual thefts of large-size vehicles—particularly trucks that were empty at the time they were stolen. Thieves-for-profit normally steal large vehicles for the cargo, not the vehicle itself. From the terrorist’s perspective, getting rid of a stolen vehicle’s cargo is a risky inconvenience.
 
Landlords and citizens should also be aware of unusual activities around apartments or rental properties. For instance, an apartment tenant may notice unusual petroleum or acidic smells coming from a neighbor’s apartment, or an employee in a rental storage complex may notice 55-gal drums being moved in or out of a rental space. These are both examples of the types of subtle indicators that ordinary citizens may observe.
 
Companies that may be targeted by terrorists should also be aware of special threat indicators. In addition to activities associated with intelligence collection, items such as the theft of employee identity cards, access key cards, or vehicle stickers should be promptly investigated. Terrorists frequently steal or forge these types of identity items to gain access to protected facilities. The unusual disappearance or murder of a facility employee is another potential threat indicator. There are a number of documented cases where terrorists have kidnapped or killed facility employees for their credentials or clothing uniforms. In Northern Ireland and the Middle East, terrorists have even taken families hostage to coerce a member of the family (usually a facility employee) to deliver a bomb by proxy.
 
Police and Suspicious Activity
 
Since September 11th, local law enforcement agencies have found themselves in the difficult situation of sorting and investigating an overwhelming number of suspicious activity reports from the public. To be effective in processing these reports, local police must be aware of what constitutes “suspicious activity” and how terrorist operations are planned and executed. Historically, recognizing indications of terrorist activity has not been a concern in domestic law enforcement training. Addressing this issue is critical if local law enforcement is to play a proactive role in homeland security.
 
In addition to investigating public reports of suspicious events, there are many types of threat indicators that law enforcement officers are most likely to observe. In this regard, local law enforcement agencies can strongly benefit by examining the training of police in countries that have had long histories of terrorist activity. For example, in Israel and the United Kingdom, most police officers are trained to be aware of abandoned objects in public places and vehicles parked in no-parking zones. In Northern Ireland, police are warned to be aware of trucks or vans with fresh rust around the base or the bumper (a potential indicator of a bomb employing ammonia or urea nitrate explosives). These are all examples of the types of items that police may encounter in the course of their ordinary activities.
 
Racial Profiling and Suspicious Activity
 
One of the most controversial issues associated with suspicious activity investigation is racial profiling. To balance the needs of homeland security and the suppression of racial prejudice, it is important that the public distinguishes the difference between perpetrator profiling and racial profiling. Racial profiling is based on the assumption that people of a specific race are prone to specific types of behavior. This is, in essence, a form of racial prejudice as it creates a generalization of all people of a certain ethnicity. Perpetrator profiling, on the other hand, examines the common characteristics of perpetrators to generate a useful and accurate picture of a typical perpetrator.
 
In perpetrator profiling, recognition of common ethnic characteristics provides a very useful tool for investigating crimes or suspicious activity—especially if the variation in ethnicity is very low. For example, the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) has identified that over 90% of malevolent criminal bombers in the United States are white males, many with specific personality traits. This does not mean that all white males are prone to being bombers. However, recognizing this characteristic is a tremendous aid to police in identifying probable suspects in the early stages of a bomb investigation. Likewise, recognizing that members of Al-Qaida are motivated by Islamist ideology and that most Al-Qaida members are of Middle-Eastern descent provides a useful tool in the early stages of investigating suspicious activity. This fact by no means suggests that all Muslims or people of Middle-Eastern origin are potential terrorists. As demonstrated throughout history, terrorism transcends all races.
 
It is equally important to recognize the limits of ethnic identification in perpetrator profiling. Though many Al-Qaida members are of Middle-Eastern origin, there are many that are not. Al-Qaida has also recruited members from Africa, Asia, and many other parts of the world. Considering this, it is very dangerous for the public or law enforcement to assume that all Al-Qaida members have a Middle-Eastern appearance. Apparent ethnicity may contribute to the probability of suspicions, but should never be regarded as a final means of qualifying a threat.
 
Terrorism Consciousness and American Society After 911
 
No one would deny that American society has changed in the aftermath of September 11th. The reality of terrorism as a threat has become imprinted in the consciousness of most everyone. From government officials and police to housewives and young children—virtually every American has felt the effect of September 11th. For many people this new awareness has led to a state of fear and frustration.
 
Nevertheless, people in many part of the world have learned to successfully cope with terrorism. In locations such as Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Israel, and Spain, terrorist attacks have been a persistent threat for decades. Yet despite the daily occurrence of bombings and armed assaults, people in these countries have learned to live with terrorism as a fact of life. Bakers still bake bread, teachers still teach, and bus drivers still drive buses. For citizens in these countries, awareness of suspicious activity and preparation during terrorist alerts are an integral part of daily life. As the American War on Terrorism continues, it is only a matter of time before the public adjusts to this new “Post-911” reality. One of the first steps in this adjustment is the realization that the public is not helpless or solely dependent on the work of the authorities. Quite the opposite: By being aware of suspicious activity and reporting these events to police, every citizen plays a vital role in winning the War on Terrorism.
 
About the authors

This essay was prepared by Craig Gundry and K.C. Poulin of Critical Intervention Services. Mr. Gundry, the Vice President of Special Projects for CIS, is a security consultant with over 13 years experience in anti-terrorism and weapon of mass destruction issues. Mr. Poulin is the President of Critical Intervention Services and a frequent lecturer on terrorism preparedness.

 
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Terrorism and 9/11

WSBD News Radio 2 (2002)

In the aftermath of 9/11, CIS security experts provided hundreds of interviews for news media organizations throughout the United States. This segment is a radio interview of CIS president K.C. Poulin on the topic of 9/11 and contemporary terrorism. Interview was conducted by phone for WSBD News Radio (Cleveland, OH).

Audio: WSBD Radio: “Terrorism and 9/11”, Pt 1

Audio: WSBD Radio: “Terrorism and 9/11”, Pt 2

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Putting a STOP to Neighborhood Drug Sales

 By K.C. Poulin, CPOI, CPS
 

In order for open narcotics sale to take place, the community must remain in a state of fear. In large, this fear is generated by criminals through the real or perceived possibility of retaliation or the threat of victimizing residents. When this fear grips the community, people become isolated and, many times, even unwilling participants in the drug trade around them. Community members will avoid confrontation and interaction with the drug dealer whenever possible, but may, when confronted, give refuge to a fleeing criminal or refuse to report the criminal to the police—simply out of fear. Often, the community becomes both the victims and the protectors of the criminal at the same time. Without the community acting in this manner, the street level narcotics dealer simply could not exist, as the dealer needs the community to conduct the business of crime.

CIS STOP team officers address the issue of community fear during the Reclamation phase of CCBPI through proactive intervention and preventative interaction with community members. Proactive Intervention involves many techniques including interference, interdiction, harassment and enforcement. Preventative Interaction, by contrast, involves communication, trust building, commitment, and caring for community members.

The dealer is at the other end of the spectrum of the community. Unlike the resident, the dealer is more than willing to get involved and fight for his self-interests, making every effort to remain in control. Unlike the community, the dealer will actually confront, provoke, and even attack when he feels that his profits are at risk. Many times s/he will do anything in order to control the community, as the community is both his protector and facilitator. The dealer also perceives the community as his customers and will struggle to maintain accessibility to his patrons.

 
matrix1

STOP team officers in phase one intentionally focus on finding the accessibility points and act as barriers to those points (as illustrated in the chart below) by placing themselves in the center of the relationship matrix. As already discussed, the primary tactics in the reclamation deployment involve proactive intervention and preventive interaction with community members, but it also involves many other approaches that must be elaborated on further. As already stated, the relationship between the drug dealer and the community is based in control and intimidation. To break this relationship, the STOP team places relentless pressure on the drug dealer by using a wide range of tactics. While some of these tactics remain invisible to the public, many are very high profile and visible to show the community that the drug dealers are not invincible. The goal is to demonstrate through actions that the drug dealers do not control the community. As a result, the community’s fear begins to subside and the drug dealers loose their hold on the population. In essence, a wedge is driven between the community and the dealer by putting pressure on the dealers (proactive intervention) while restoring courage and ownership to the community through communication (preventative interaction).

matrix02

The relationship between dealer and buyer must also be analyzed and targeted with the same focus on interruption. A key element in this relationship is accessibility. STOP team officers must focus on disrupting accessibility by creating barriers that interfere with the sale and purchase of narcotics. The weakest link in this relationship that can accomplish this is the buyer. The buyer, generally, does not instill fear in the community or fight to retain a source of financial profit. It is true that buyers often victimize communities in order to finance their drug habits through crimes such as burglary, theft, and robbery. However, the intent of the buyer is not to instill fear or control the community, but to gain the resources needed to purchase narcotics. Generally, the buyer wants to stay as inconspicuous as possible. The buyer, for most purposes, is neutral to the environment in terms of fear and control. The primary goal of the buyer is the purchase of narcotics and, subsequently, the use of narcotics at a convenient and discreet location.

When cleaning up drug activity in an area, a time will come where the officers will need to shift pressure from the dealer to the buyer. This is the only way to truly remove drug activity from an environment. When the dealer does not intimidate easily or does not want to stop selling because the customer base is too good, STOP team officers shift focus from the dealer to the customer. The objective is not necessarily to conduct arrests. Rather, the buyer is pressured out of the relationship by intimidation. Officers for example, may remain on a street corner for 8 hours in plain sight equipped with a video recorder, recording drug dealers and their buyers. At the sight of the officers with camcorders, buyers quickly leave the area for fear of identification. Again, the tactic is based on the theory that the buyer is the weakest link in the relationship and, therefore, focus must shift to the buyer to ensure success when other techniques are not completely successful. Considering the simple rules of economics, by focusing on the buyer and removing the demand, the dealer will have no other option but to relocate his/her drug sales. This same principle applies to any other business that is not capable of attracting customers. They must move, change the way they do business, or ultimately go out of business.

Community Crime Prevention Intervention Strategy

Another element of the relationship that exists with drug activity is the dealer’s efforts to expand his/her new customer base. A main focus of drug dealers is converting community members into customers, transitioning people from the community ring into the buyer ring. CIS officers attempt to implement barriers by utilizing proactive intervention techniques and preventative interaction with community members, specifically the children. When dealers want to create new customers, children of the area are the preferred targets. Techniques for addressing this issue are usually implemented as part of the sustained approach beginning in Phase Two of the CCBPI program.

Crime Prevention Strategy for Drug Dealing in Communities

As demonstrated in this example, by utilizing a systematic approach, STOP officers are able to insert barriers throughout the matrix and successfully disrupt the relationships between the community, the buyer, and the dealer. This approach to tailoring STOP activities to specific criminal problems is universal, applying to gangs, prostitution, and many other types of criminal activities.

Click here for more information about the CIS CCBPI strategy.
Click here for more information about Symmetry Targeted Oriented Patrolling (STOP) operations.

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CIS STOP Operations in Response to Crime in Urban Communities

The O’Reilly Factor (1997)

Interview between Fox News Channel’s Bill O’Reilly and CIS President K.C. Poulin. The topic is CIS STOP operations in response to crime in urban communities. Originally aired on The O’Reilly Factor in 1997.

Video: O’Reilly Factor, Part 1

Video: O’Reilly Factor, Part 2

Audio: O’Reilly Factor, Part 1

Audio: O’Reilly Factor, Part 2

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