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Facility Preparation for Active Shooter Attacks: Key Objectives (Pt. 3)

Design Basis Threat and The Active Shooter

Facility Preparation for Active Shooter Attacks: Key Objectives (Pt. 3)

In Part 1 of this series, we discussed how the integration of detection, delay, and response functions influences the overall performance of physical security. In security designs aimed at the protection of inanimate assets  (such as theft prevention and anti-sabotage situations), hardware components and physical construction (e.g.,  anti-personnel barriers, alarm systems, CCTV, etc.) are often the primary elements facilitating detection and delay. However, in the case of active shooter attacks, anticipating the actions of facility occupants is critical in designing a successful system.

Most organizations concerned about active shooter attacks have adopted the US Department of Homeland Security’s classic ‘Run-Hide-Fight’ doctrine as the basis for designing facility emergency action plans and training employees. This simplified response guidance is presented as a prioritized list of preferred protective responses when an active shooter attack is recognized. “Run,” for instance, should always be the first option when the opportunity is present. If “Run” is not possible, then “Hide” is the next prioritized option.

Although “Run” is generally the most preferred response, there are situations where attempting escape may be more dangerous than simply remaining in place. A good example is a multi-story building when an attack is launched at ground level. Rarely during attacks do people in the “hot zone” have accurate and real-time knowledge of the attacker’s location and safe routes of escape. In this situation, trying to evacuate through lower levels of the building where possible massacre is in progress may be far more dangerous than barricading in a nearby safe location.

To ensure best performance during armed attacks, facilities should be designed or upgraded to support these response actions and proactively address common challenges faced by people during life-threatening events.

Physical Security and Active Shooters: Key Objectives

The following points summarize key measures for protecting facility occupants during active shooter events.

Delay the attacker’s ingress into populated areas to permit time for critical alerts, escape and refuge actions, and deployment of the response force. (DELAY)

Protective layers should be designed to delay adversary movement into populated areas. If the attacker is an ‘outsider,’ this includes exterior barrier layers (e.g., facade glazing, doors, locks, etc.) and delay measures at entry points and public reception areas (e.g., lobbies, etc.). Additional protective layers securing work suites and high-valued assets (e.g., executive offices, etc.) should be used to frustrate adversary ingress further and provide critical delay against movement by ‘insider’ adversaries already located inside the building.

Expedite detection and assessment of the threat. (DETECTION)

As discussed in Part 1 of this series, time is critical during active shooter events and every measure that expedites detection of the attack and deployment of an armed response force is critical in mitigating  consequences. Measures that expedite event notification to security or authorities, such as panic alarms or gunshot detection systems, can greatly reduce the typical reporting times normally encountered by relying on witnesses to call an emergency number by telephone.

Rapidly and reliably alert all facility occupants. (DETECTION)

A critical part of effective response during active shooter events is fast and reliable alert to expedite protective actions by employees. Critical alerts should ideally be issued by audible means (public address) for the benefit of all facility occupants, and where feasible, followed by a redundant mass notification system (MNS) message for those who may not have heard the initial announcement. When important developments occur, updates can be issued to employees as follow up messages.

Facilitate easy and rapid evacuation/escape by employees and facility guests. (DELAY)

For employees located outdoors, ground level, or in building locations without safe refuge options, escape (DHS’ term ‘Run’) is the primary response. Escape routes should be abundantly available, easy to locate, and permit fast and unobstructed egress to safe locations away from the facility.

Provide safe refuge options for employees and facility guests unable to safely evacuate or who are unaware of the threat’s location. (DELAY)

One of the most basic facility preparations is ensuring adequate availability of safe rooms for people to take refuge if escape is not feasible. For this purpose, rooms should be abundantly available throughout the facility capable of providing adequate delay against forced entry considering the methods and tools likely to be employed by attackers.

Expedite the intervention of a response force capable of neutralizing an armed adversary. (RESPONSE)

Although many active shooter attacks terminate in suicide before the intervention of police or security forces, the speed at which security or police arrive and locate the adversary has a major impact on consequences of the event.

In an ideal scenario, police or armed security officers would be assigned to reliably ensure fast response times. If an organization cannot implement an on-site armed response capability, additional measures should be used to expedite the effective response of local police. Some examples include marking buildings on multi-building campuses with distinctive signage to ease location, establishing procedures for orienting and directing law enforcement officers as they arrive on scene, and preparations for providing building keys, access control badges, and floor plans to facilitate unimpeded movement by police.

Ensure employees are prepared to respond safely and without direction.

Even the best designed plans and facility preparations will fail if employees are unprepared to take independent action for their self-preservation during active shooter events. As detailed further in Part 4 of this series, the effects of the sympathetic nervous system during high stress events and lack of situational awareness can have a debilitating effect on employee response and even lead to dangerous actions. The first step in combating this problem is training employees in emergency response procedures.

The Department of Homeland Security and various municipalities throughout the US have produced short videos useful for this purpose. It is also recommended that training include instructor-led discussion about facility-specific measures for contacting security or police, location of suitable safe rooms inside the facility, special egress considerations (e.g., feasibility of roof access, etc.), communications systems, and location of medical kits.

In the next part of this series, we’ll explore common challenges and unique circumstances that often influence how these principles are best applied in different facility situations.

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.
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Design Basis Threat and The Active Shooter (Pt. 2)

Design Basis Threat and The Active Shooter (Pt. 2)

Who exactly are we trying to protect ourselves against when we use the term “active shooter?”

For many, the answer to this question seems obvious—a “bad guy” killing people at random with a gun. However, this type of vague definition provides little guidance for developing an effective security design. A more useful definition considers:

    • How many adversaries would possibly be involved in an attack?
    • What is their level of skill?
    • What types of weapons would they bear?
    • What tools and methods of entry would they employ?
    • Would the attacker(s) likely be an insider, outsider, or potentially either?
    • Has the adversary employed any unique modus operandi in previous attacks?

Although many aspects of active shooter preparation are universal, these types of details have a major influence on the performance of our protective design and the benefit of system components (e.g., anti-personnel barriers, ballistic protection, etc.). Additionally, if our budget is limited, the answers to these questions can often guide us in prioritizing vulnerabilities of greatest concern.

As a security consultant, I’m frequently called on to assess facilities that have already invested in protective upgrades. In these situations, I frequently find examples of overlooked vulnerabilities, overconfidence in protective measures, or wasted expenditure. And these problems often stem from failing to define the attacker’s likely capabilities and methods as a driving factor in the original security design.

In professional approaches to security planning, this is the role of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) or Threat Definition. A DBT (or Threat Definition) provides a description of an adversary’s likely capabilities and tactics essential for determining the expected performance of security measures and identifying attack scenarios that should be addressed in security design.

Considerations for Developing a Design Basis Threat

Number of Attackers

The number of adversaries has a direct relationship to the potential effectiveness of our response force (i.e., Probability of Neutralization) and may influence the behavior of adversaries during attacks. One practical example is the likelihood of adversaries forcibly entering secured rooms to locate targets. Many documented incidents where adversaries forcibly entered locked rooms to seek targets involved more than one perpetrator.[1]

In the United States, the spectrum of active shooter adversaries has historically been quite diverse with most attacks committed by non-ideologically motivated perpetrators in alignment with Dr. Park Dietz’s definition of a pseudocommando.[2] The majority of these attacks are executed by a single attacker withstanding a handful of notable exceptions (e.g., 1998 Westside Middle School, 1999 Columbine High School, 2011 South Jamaica House Party, and 2012 Tulsa[3]). Historically, most terrorist-related active shooter attacks in the United States also involved only one perpetrator with exceptions including the 2015 San Bernardino and 2015 Curtis Culwell Center attacks.

Regional trends in adversary characteristics vary greatly in different parts of the world. In locations where terrorist attacks are the predominant concern, the number of perpetrators in attacks is often higher. In a study of 20 Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks (MTFA) conducted by the Critical Intervention Services in 2015, 1-2 perpetrators was most common in active shooter assaults in Europe with notable exceptions being events such as the 13 November Paris attacks.[4] In Africa, by contrast, terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab frequently use teams of 4-9 attackers in assaults on civilian locations such as the Westgate Shopping Mall (2013), Garissa University (2015), and numerous hotels in Mogadishu.[5]

Relationship to the Facility/Organization

Is the adversary possibly an “insider” (e.g., current student, employee, etc.)? Or do the characteristics of our organization and environmental circumstances likely limit our concern to “outsider” adversaries? The answers to these questions often determine the relevance and priority of protective measures.

For instance, if the adversary is most likely an outsider, protective measures associated with perimeters, building facades, and entry controls are a high priority. By contrast, if the probable adversary is an insider, it is often wise to focus on indoor protective measures if the budget is a limiting concern. 

In school settings, the probable type of adversary is largely influenced by the age of students. Withstanding a handful of plots, shooting events in primary schools have been executed by adult-aged outsiders (e.g., 2017 North Park Elementary School, 2012 Sandy Hook, 2006 West Nickel Mines, etc.) and a handful of expelled students (e.g., 2016 Townville Elementary School). In secondary schools, the spectrum of perpetrators is more diverse including both current and former students, and to a lesser degree, adult-aged outsiders.

In closed workplace settings, the majority of mass shootings are committed by current or former employees (e.g., 2020 Molson Coors, 2019 Henry Pratt Co., 2019 Virginia Beach Municipal Center, etc.). Although less common than employee-related shootings, there have also been cases of nonemployees (outsiders) targeting businesses for reasons of personal or ideological grievance such as the 2018 shooting at YouTube headquarters and the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack.

In attacks against houses of worship and ethnic cultural centers, outsider adversaries motivated by ideology or reasons of personal grievance have been most common. Some recent examples include attacks at the Poway Synagogue (2018), Tree of Life Synagogue (2018), First Baptist Church (2017), Burnette Chapel Church of Christ (2017), Emanuel AME Church (2015), and Overland Park Jewish Center (2014).

Outsiders have also been the dominant category of adversary in attacks against public entertainment venues such as nightclubs, theaters, entertainment districts, and festivals. In many of these situations, the venue is targeted due to mass casualty potential or the characteristics of its patrons. Examples in recent years include attacks at the Nels Peppers Bar (2019), Gilroy Garlic Festival (2019), Borderline Bar and Grill (2018), Jacksonville Landing (2018), Route 91 Harvest Festival (2017), Reina nightclub (2017), and Pulse nightclub (2016). Although most attacks in entertainment facilities are premeditated, there have also been cases of disputes among patrons escalating into mass violence such as the 2017 shootings at the Power Ultra Lounge and Cameo nightclub.

In situations where terrorism is the primary concern, outsider adversaries should be the first priority. Although there have been attacks executed by radicalized employees (e.g., 2019 Naval Air Station Pensacola, 2015 Inland Regional Center, 2009 Fort Hood, etc.), the overwhelming majority of terrorist armed assaults are executed by outsiders.

Entry Tools and Methods

 The delay time value of barriers (e.g., doors, locks, glazing, etc.) is directly related to the tools and methods adversaries may use to breach our barriers. Attacker tools and entry methods was one of the issues the CIS MTFA study team examined with the aim of creating a research-supported justification for defining threat capabilities.[6] Of the attacks assessed as part the study, in none of the events did attackers arrive equipped with tools (other than firearms) for the specific purpose of penetrating barriers. In case research conducted by CIS about other armed attacks against facilities over the past 20 years, the number of incidents where adversaries brought tools specifically for forced entry purposes was few. In the majority of attacks, forced entry was facilitated exclusively by blunt object impact (e.g., kicking, beating with rifle butt stock, etc.) and sometimes aided by bullet penetration or cutting with a bladed weapon.

For the purpose of designating or planning potential safe rooms, another issue worth considering is adversary effort and commitment to attack people located inside locked rooms. Joseph Smith and Daniel Renfroe describe their observations on this matter in an article on the World Building Design Guide web site: “Analysis of footage from actual active shooter events have shown that the shooter will likely not spend significant time trying to get through a particular door if it is locked or blocked. Rather they move to their next target. They know law enforcement is on its way and that time is limited. “[7] Separate case study research conducted by Critical Intervention Services also supports this perspective.

In a large percentage of attacks, adversaries focus solely on targets of easiest opportunity by using visually-obvious pathways and unlocked/unobstructed portals (e.g., doors, windows, etc) to facilitate indoor movement. This behavior may be due to perceived time pressure (“kill as many as possible before the police arrive”) or possibly diminished problem-solving ability resulting from activation of the Sympathetic Nervous System (SNS). In most documented attacks where adversaries committed effort to forcibly enter locked rooms, intervention by police or security forces was delayed and adversaries had exhausted all targets in accessible areas. 

When developing a DBT for use in a region where the main threat concern is a particular terrorist group, research should focus on identifying any unique tactics or preferences for entry methods demonstrated in previous attacks. Al-Shabaab, for instance, has employed disguise and deceptive entry tactics for gaining access through the outer perimeter of several protected facilities in Somalia. If we were developing a DBT for Al-Shabaab, it would be wise to consider attack scenarios employing deception and disguise in addition to overt entry methods.

Weaponry

Weaponry influences the potential effectiveness of our response force, and caliber and type of ammunition determines the effectiveness of ballistic barriers in resisting bullet penetration.

According to FBI statistics, handguns were the most powerful firearm used in most attacks (59%) with rifles constituting 26% of incidents.[8] Although the FBI has not published statistics on weapon calibers used in active shooter attacks, most mass casualty attacks where rifles were employed in the United States involved 5.56mm weapons with examples including assaults at the Pulse Nightclub (2016), Inland Regional Center (2015), Sandy Hook Elementary School (2013), and Aurora Century 16 Theater (2012).

Outside the United States, 7.62x39mm weapons (AK-47) have been most common.

Likelihood of a Hostage/Siege Event

Although not directly related to adversary capabilities, another possible factor to consider is the likely duration of an event. If the adversary is a terrorist group with a specific preference for hostage-taking or if we are located in a region where there has often been delayed intervention by police/security forces, circumstances may justify a more advanced level of preparation.

In the 2015 CIS MTFA study, 35% of all attacks escalated into a siege by police/security forces upon arrival. In a number of these incidents, intervention was delayed due to early confusion about the event (“hostage situation” versus “armed massacre”). Some events resulted in a siege when arriving police or security forces were overwhelmed by the adversary’s firepower and withdrew pending the arrival of more assistance. In other events, police and security forces made committed entry but the size of facility and movement of the attackers inside the building delayed location and neutralization of the adversaries (e.g., 2019 Virginia Beach Municipal Center, 2013 Washington Navy Yard, 2015 Corinthia Hotel Tripoli, etc.).

Incidents documented in the CIS study that escalated into a siege had a duration ranging between 2h 24m and est. 96 hours, with a mean duration of 21h 44m. Although most events resulting in siege durations over 2 hours were in Africa or West Asia, recent incidents have occurred in Western countries with effective response times over 2 hours such as the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting (194 minutes from first call to 911) and Bataclan Theater (~156 minutes from first call to 112).  

Developing a Design Basis Threat for Active Shooter Attacks

In the government community, many organizations promulgate official DBT statements to serve as a standardized reference throughout the organization. For instance, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) in the United States produces a Design Basis Threat (DBT) document for use during risk assessments and security planning in Federal facilities. The ISC DBT includes several threat scenarios related to armed attack with narrative descriptions of the event, and adversary characteristics such as numbers of adversaries, weaponry, tactics, etc.

The US Department of Defense also provides similar guidance for DoD facilities in UFC 4-020-01 “DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual.”[9] In Table 3-27, DoD presents a generic DBT (Threat Parameters) including several categories of Aggressor Tactics and a system for defining progressive levels of threat. Each threat level is attributed a corresponding description of weaponry, toolset, and/or delivery method.

As a consultant, I am not an advocate of adopting generic DBTs unless required by official mandate. Instead, I prefer using a research-based approach which considers the specific characteristics of relevant adversaries, historical attack data, regional trends, and similar issues. This type of approach is often more laborious, but results in a custom DBT that is rational, justifiable, and specific to the threat situation.

When developing a custom DBT, I typically begin by collecting data about attacks against similar facilities in the region or attacks perpetrated by adversaries of relevance with focus on weaponry, number of attackers, and tactics. The following table illustrates how this type of data collection might be applied for a facility in Kenya where Al-Shabaab is the primary adversary of concern.

Al-Shabaab Attacks

After data has been collected, a threat definition is then developed representing likely adversary capabilities and modus operandi. In a basic approach, the DBT is written to match any capabilities well established by trend or average. In a cautious or very cautious approach, the DBT matches or exceeds the highest level of capability as demonstrated in previous attacks.

Al-Shabaab Design Basis Threat

Even in situations where there are no unique adversary groups to serve as a model, this same type of research-supported approach can be applied for creating a non-specific, but justifiable DBT. Following are some examples of reasonable threat definitions based on historical attack data and well-established trends in different regions of the world.

Active Shooter Characteristics by Region

[1] Examples including the 2015 Corinthia Hotel Tripoli attack and 2008 Taj Majal attack.

[2] Dietz, Park D. “Mass, Serial, and Sensational Homicides.” Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine.  62:49-91. 1986.

[3] Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 – 2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C. 2014. pp. 7. PDF. (The 2011 South Jamaica and 2012 Tulsa shootings are specifically noted as the only events involving more than one attacker in the FBI’s study of U.S. domestic active shooter attacks between 2000 and 2013.)

[4] Gundry, Craig S. “Analysis of 20 Marauding Terrorist Firearm Attacks.” Preparing for Active Shooter Events. ASIS Europe 2017, 30 Mar. 2017, Milan, Italy.

[5] Gundry, Craig S. “Threat Assessment Methodology and Development of Design Basis Threats.” Assessing Terrorism Related Risk Workshop. S2 Safety & Intelligence Institute, 25 Apr. 2017, Brussels, Belgium.

[6] Gundry, Craig S. “Analysis of 20 Marauding Terrorist Firearm Attacks.” Preparing for Active Shooter Events. ASIS Europe 2017, 30 Mar. 2017, Milan, Italy. (Presentation included results of an unpublished 2015 study by Critical Intervention Services.

[7] Smith, Joseph, and Daniel Renfroe. “Active Shooter: Is There a Role for Protective Design?” World Building Design Guide, National Institute of Building Sciences, 2 Aug. 2016, www.wbdg.org/resources/active-shooter-there-role-protective-design. Accessed 22 Sept. 2017.

[8] Blair, J. Pete, Martaindale, M. Hunter, and Nichols, Terry. “Active Shooter Events from 2002 to 2012.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1 July 2014, https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-from-2000-to-2012. Accessed 22 Sept. 2017.

[9] UFC 4-020-01, DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual. US Department of Defense, N.p.: 2008.

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.
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Copyright © 2020 by Craig S. Gundry, PSP, cATO

CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist organizations in managing risks of active shooter violence. 
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Physical Security Design and The Active Shooter (Pt. 1)

Physical Security and Active Shooter Attacks

Physical Security Design and The Active Shooter (Pt. 1)

When many people think of physical security, the first ideas that come to mind are things like locks, alarm systems, screening with metal detectors, CCTV, etc.—hardware components or procedures. Although these elements play a role in physical security, they have no value outside the context of the overarching system design.

In the context of active assailant attacks, performance-based physical security design integrates Detection, Delay, and Response elements in a manner that mathematically reconciles the time required for an adversary to commence mass killing and the time required for detection and response by security or police.

Fundamentally, physical security design is a mathematics problem defined by several key times and probabilities. The main performance metric of a Physical Protection System (PPS) design is its Probability of Interruption, defined as the probability that an adversary will be detected and intercepted by a response force before he/she can complete their objective.[1] The most important elements determining the Probability of Interruption are the Adversary Task Time (total time required for an adversary to enter a facility and access their target) and response force time. If the total time for detection, assessment, communications, and response force intervention is longer than the adversary task time, the system will fail. Specific elements alone (such as having an access control system or CCTV cameras) mean nothing outside the context of the overall system design. Individual PPS elements must work together integrally to reconcile these key times or the adversary will succeed.

In the context of active shooter events, detection usually is the result of visual or audible observation when the attack commences. Detection may also result from an alarm signal generated by forced entry into secured spaces or gunshot detection systems. The Time of Detection during an attack is represented in figure 1 as TD.

The time the report is received by authorities and/or assessed by a security control room for deployment of on-site armed officers is represented in the diagram as TA (Time of Assessment).

After the 911/112 center or security control room is alerted, the response force is subsequently dispatched to intercept and neutralize the adversary. This is represented in the following diagram as the Time of Interruption (TI).

Physical Protection System Times and Functions

While the alert and response force deployment is in progress, the adversary advances through barriers and distance to access targets and initiate mass killing. The time mass killing is in progress is represented in the previous diagram as Time of Completion (TC). The Adversary Task Time is the cumulative time between the Time of Detection and the Time of Completion. If the Time of Interruption is before the Time of Completion, the Physical Protection System (PPS) is successful in its function of preventing mass killing.

In most previous active shooter attacks, deficiencies in one or more key functional elements (Detection, Delay, or Response) result in a situation where mass killing (TC) initiates before the response force intervenes (TI).

Based on data yielded during several studies of active shooter attacks, the consequences of the difference in time between commencement of mass killing and response force intervention (TC versus TI) can be estimated as one casualty per 15 seconds.[2] 

Physical Security and Active Shooter Planning

Although the ideal objective of PPS design is to interrupt mass killing before it commences, real world conditions often limit the possibility of achieving a high Probability of Interruption. This type of situation is often common in ‘soft target’ facilities due to the need for unobstructed public access and facilities reliant on the unpredictable response times of off-site police. Other real world challenges such as cultural expectations, branding, and budget boundaries often limit the feasibility of implementing ideal physical security measures. And if an attack is launched by an insider adversary (e.g., employee, student, etc.) already inside the facility, physical protection elements at outer protective layers (e.g., perimeter, building envelope, entrances, etc.) will have little or no benefit.

Nevertheless, all measures that increase Adversary Task Time and expedite response time have a direct benefit in reducing potential casualties by narrowing the gap between TC and TI.

Sandy Hook Elementary School, 14 December 2012: Case Study of Performance-Based Physical Security Principles in Practical Application

 At approximately 09:34, Adam Lanza used an AR-15 rifle to shoot through a tempered glass window adjacent to the school’s locked entrance doors and passed into the lobby.[3]

 After killing the school principal and a school psychologist and injuring two other staff members who entered the hallway to investigate, Lanza entered the school office. Meanwhile, staff members concealed inside the school office and nearby rooms initiated the first calls to 911. Staff located throughout the building were alerted when the ‘all-call’ button on a telephone was accidentally activated during a 911 call.

After finding no targets in the office, Lanza returned to the hallway and proceeded into the unlocked door of first grade classroom 8 where mass murder commenced (approx. 09:36).[4] In less than two minutes, Lanza killed two teachers and fifteen students.

Sandy Hook Elementary Attack Diagram

As the attack in classroom 8 was in progress, teacher Victoria Soto and a teaching assistant in classroom 10 attempted to conceal children in cabinets and a closet.

After exhausting targets in classroom 8, Lanza proceeded into classroom 10 and killed Ms. Soto, assistant Anne Murphy, and five children. Although the exact reason Ms. Soto did not lock the door to classroom 10 is unknown, all classrooms at Sandy Hook Elementary School featured ANSI/BHMA “classroom-function” (mortise F05 and bored F84) locks which can only be locked with a key from the hallway-side of the door.

The tragedy ended in classroom 10 when Lanza committed suicide at 09:40 while police were preparing for entry into the building.

As common in U.S. primary schools, Sandy Hook Elementary School relied on off-site police as their response force during emergency events. Response was first initiated at 09:35 when a staff member called 911 to report the crisis. At 09:36, an alert was broadcast by radio and police units were dispatched to the school. The first police unit arrived at 09:39, followed immediately by two other units. After assessing the scene and planning a point of entry, the officers organized into a contact team and made entry into the school at 09:44.

In the context of physical protection system performance, the adversary task time (time between when Lanza’s entry commenced and mass killing was in progress) at Sandy Hook Elementary School was approximately 23 seconds. The time between detection of the attack and on-site arrival of police was slightly less than three minutes. However, there was an additional 5-6 minutes of time as officers assessed the situation and organized before making entry and effectively moving indoors to neutralize the killer. When assessing incidents involving response by off-site police, arrival time at the scene is irrelevant. What matters is the time ending when police arrive at the immediate location of the adversary ready to neutralize the threat. This describes the contrast between On-Site Response Time and Effective Response Time. At Sandy Hook Elementary School, the Effective Response Time was approximately nine minutes.

As illustrated in the following table, the variation between Adversary Task Time and Effective Response Time witnessed at Sandy Hook Elementary School has been historically common during active assailant attacks. In each of the six events documented below, mass killing was in full progress within 1-3 minutes of the time the attacker entered the building or shot the first victim. By comparison, the Effective Response Times ranged between 7 and 38 minutes, with most events ending prior to intervention by police when the attacker(s) escaped or committed suicide.

Active Shooter Timeline Infographic

Mitigating the consequences of active shooter attacks through better physical security design and integration

 

In the Newtown tragedy, PPS failure was largely the result of inadequate delay in relation to the time required for response by off-site police. When the attack is analyzed using Sandia’s Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) Model, the original PPS at Sandy Hook Elementary School would have had a Probability of Interruption of 0.0006 (Very Low).

Sandy Hook Shooting Timeline
Sandy Hook Shoting - EASI Attack Analysis

In the case of Sandy Hook Elementary School, there are a number of measures that could have improved overall system performance.

Upgrade the facade with intrusion-resistant glazing. Adam Lanza entered the building by bypassing the locked entrance doors and shooting a hole through the adjacent tempered glass window. He then struck the fractured window and climbed through the breach. Tempered safety glass is generally only 4-5 times resistant to impact as annealed glass and provides minimal delay against forced intrusion. According to testing documented by Sandia National Laboratories, 0.25 inch tempered glass provides 3-9 seconds of delay against an intruder using a fire axe and the mean delay time for penetrating 1/8″ tempered glass with a hammer is 0.5 minutes.[5] However, impact testing documented by Sandia did not account for the fragility of a tempered glass specimen after first being penetrated by firearm projectile. In penetration tests Critical Intervention Services conducted of 1/4-inch tempered glass windows using several shots from a 9mm handgun to penetrate glazing prior to impact by hand, delay time was only 10 seconds.[6]

Upgrading facade glazing with the use of mechanically-attached anti-shatter film could have improved delay time at the exterior protective layer by 60-90 seconds.[7]

Construct an interior protective layer to delay access from the lobby into occupied school corridors. Once Adam Lanza breached the exterior facade into the school lobby, there were no additional barrier layers delaying access into areas occupied by students and faculty. A significant percentage of active shooter assaults by outsider adversaries originate through main entrances and progress into occupied spaces.[8] Some examples include attacks at the Riena Nightclub (2017), Pulse Nightclub (2016), Charlie Hebdo Office (2015), Inland Regional Center (2015), Colorado Springs Planned Parenthood (2015), Centre Block Parliament Bldg (2014), and US Holocaust Memorial Museum (2009).
 
An ideal lobby upgrade would be designed to facilitate reception of visitors while securing the interior of the school through a protective layer constructed of intrusion-resistant materials. Depending on material specifications, an interior barrier layer could have delayed Adam Lanza’s progress into the school by an additional 60-120 seconds.
 
Sandy Hook Elementary School Lobby Concept

Replace “classroom-function” locks on school doors with locks featuring an interior button or thumbturn. All classroom doors inside Sandy Hook Elementary were equipped with ANSI “classroom-function” locks (mortise F05 and bored F84). These are perhaps the worst choice of locks possible for lockdown purposes during active shooter events. As witnessed in a number of attacks, doors equipped with classroom-function locks often remain unlocked due to difficulty locating or manipulating keys under stress. In addition to Sandy Hook classroom 10, another incident where this situation clearly contributed to unnecessary casualties was the 2007 Virginia Tech Norris Hall attack.[9] In these two events alone, 26 students and faculty were killed and 24 wounded specifically because the doors to classrooms could not be reliably secured.

Ideal specifications for door locks would be ANSI/BHMA A156 Grade 1 with an ANSI lock code of F04 or F82.[10] Mechanical locks rated ANSI/BHMA Grade 1 have been successfully evaluated under a variety of static force and torque tests. Locks coded as F04 and F82 feature buttons or thumbturns to facilitate ease of locking under stress.

Although there are no empirical sources citing tested forced entry times against ANSI/BHMA A156 Grade 1 rated locks, it is estimated that a committed adversary using impact force with no additional tools could penetrate improved locks in approximately 90-110 seconds.

Replace door vision panels with intrusion-resistant glazing. During the attack at Sandy Hook Elementary, Adam Lanza was able to enter classrooms 8 and 10 directly through unlocked doors. If these classrooms were secured, the tempered glass vision panels on all classroom doors could have been easily breached to facilitate entry in less than 10 seconds.

An effective approach to physical security specification would ensure that all barriers composing the classroom protective layer are composed of materials with similar delay time values. This could be accomplished by ensuring that vision panels are no wider than 1.5″ (3.8 cm) or constructed of intrusion-resistant glazing such as laminated glass, polycarbonate, or reinforced with anti-shatter film.

If the aforementioned barrier improvements were employed in the PPS design at Sandy Hook Elementary School, Adam Lanza’s access into occupied classrooms would have been delayed by an additional 162-312 seconds. This would have improved the overall performance of the PPS by potentially increasing the Adversary Task Time to 185-335 seconds before mass killing was in progress. Although this is a significant improvement from the original Adversary Task Time (est. 23 seconds), 335 seconds is still less than the estimated response time of police during the original event (est. 544 seconds).

In many cases, accomplishing the performance-based objective of interrupting an active shooter before mass killing commences requires a combined approach aimed at both increasing delay time and decreasing response force time. In the case of Sandy Hook Elementary School, decreased response time could have been facilitated by the use of gunshot detection technology or duress alarms, improved communications procedures, and similar improvements. Any measure that decreases alert notification and response times has a beneficial impact on system performance. Even if enhancements only reduce response time by 10 or 15 seconds, such improvements have the theoretical benefit of reducing casualties by one victim per fifteen seconds of decreased response time.

In the situation of Sandy Hook Elementary School, the greatest improvement could have resulted from having an on-site response force (e.g., armed school resource officer) capable of reliably responding anywhere on the school campus within 120 seconds of alert.[11] If this measure were implemented, the total estimated alert and response time could have been improved to 147-157 seconds. When compared to the increased Adversary Task Time of 206-316 seconds, the improved PPS design would have likely resulted in interruption before mass homicide commenced. When analyzed using Sandia’s Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) Model, the improved PPS would have resulted in a Probability of Interruption of 0.87 (Very High).

The following table and spreadsheet models the PPS improvements described in this article to demonstrate how performance-based physical security design can influence the outcome of armed attacks.

Sandy Hook Elementary - Improved Security Design
Sandy Hook Elementary Physical Security

Threat Characteristics and Physical Security Performance

The delay time expectations of physical barriers cited in this article were based on the weaponry and methods of entry employed by Adam Lanza at Sandy Hook Elementary School. If Lanza had employed different tools or methods, the delay time of barriers would have correspondingly been different. The same principle is true for bullet-resistant barriers. The ballistic resistance of materials is directly relative to the caliber and type of ammunition used by an adversary.

To ensure a security design performs as expected, it is first necessary to establish a definition of the adversary’s likely capabilities and tactics. In Part 2 of this series, we’ll continue this discussion by exploring trends in the behavior of attackers, threat capabilities and methods, and approaches to developing a Design Basis Threat (DBT) suitable for security planning.

[1] Garcia, Mary Lynn. Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems. Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007.

[2] Anklam, Charles, Adam Kirby, Filipo Sharevski, and J. Eric Dietz. “Mitigating Active Shooter Impact: Analysis for Policy Options Based on Agent/computer-based Modeling.” Journal of Emergency Management 13.3 (2014): 201-16.

[3] Sedensky, Stephen J. Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012. Danbury, Ct.: Office of the State’s Attorney. Judicial District of Danbury, 2013. Print.

[4] Time estimated based on witness event descriptions and assessment of time required to walk through the school office and down the corridor to classroom 8.

[5] Barrier Technology Handbook, SAND77-0777. Sandia Laboratories, 1978.

[6] Critical Intervention Services assisted a window film manufacturer in 2015 in conducting a series of timed penetration tests of 1/4-inch tempered glass windows with mechanically-attached 11 mil window film. The tests involved penetration by firearm followed by impact (kicking and rifle buttstock). The delay times ranged from 62 to 94 seconds and deviated according to the aggression of our penetration tester.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Gundry, Craig S. “Analysis of 20 Marauding Terrorist Firearm Attacks.” Preparing for Active Shooter Events. ASIS Europe 2017, 30 Mar. 2017, Milan, Italy.

[9] Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech. April 16, 2007. Report of the Review Panel. Virginia Tech Review Panel. August 2007. pp.13.

[10] ANSI/BHMA A156.13, Mortise Locks and Latches. Builders Hardware Manufacturers Association (BHMA), New York, NY, 2011.

[11] CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® standards define a performance benchmark of 120 seconds as the maximum time for acceptable response by on-site officers. However, achieving this type of response time in many facilities requires careful consideration of facility geography, communications systems, access obstructions, and officer capabilities (e.g., training, physical conditioning, etc.).

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.
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CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist organizations in managing risks of active shooter violence. 
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Facility Preparation and The Active Shooter Threat (Main Article)

Facility Preparation and The Active Shooter Threat (Main Article)

Comprehensive risk management programs employ a multi-layered approach to reducing the risk of active shooter violence. Issues such as threat recognition and assessment, reinforcement of positive workplace/school climate and culture, suspicious activity recognition and reporting, emergency planning, and employee training all contribute to reducing the risk of active shooter attacks. However, if measures employed to prevent attacks are unsuccessful or an outsider targets the facility in a manner that evades our proactive influence, physical security and infrastructure readiness are crucial factors influencing the consequences of the event.

In recent years, much has been published focused on managing risks of active shooter violence through preventive approaches and response training. Organizations such as the US Department of Homeland Security, ASIS International, and the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals offer a wealth of information to assist in developing threat assessment and management programs and training employees in active assailant response.

Unfortunately, far less attention has been devoted to equally important matters of building design and physical security. Withstanding a handful of essays and school-related publications, there is little guidance in print about designing and preparing facilities for active shooter violence. Further, most guides that have explored this subject to date have been basic and tend to overlook important vulnerability issues and technical details.

The following collection of articles aims to address this situation and serve as a comprehensive design guide and technical reference for architects, building managers, and security professionals. The essays in this series were originally prepared for a book I have been writing for the past few years. Although I will probably submit the final body of work for print when everything is complete, we have decided to publicly release what has been written thus far in hope of filling the gap in current literature.  

Protective Design Concepts

Parts 1-4 of this series provide an overview of protective strategy for reducing active shooter risk, principles of performance-based physical security, and practical issues that should be considered during the design process.

      1. Physical Security Design & The Active Shooter
      2. Design Basis Threat & The Active Shooter
      3. Facility Preparation for Active Shooter Attacks: Key Objectives
      4. Unique Planning Considerations

Universal Protective Measures

Parts 5-14 of the series address specific preparation matters applicable to most facilities including topics such as secure entry control, safe rooms, egress design, and emergency communications infrastructure.

      1. Outdoor Protective Measures
      2. Building Envelope & Entrance Design
      3. Entry Control Screening
      4. Access Control Systems
      5. Safe Rooms
      6. Egress Design
      7. Attack Detection Systems
      8. Emergency Communications Infrastructure
      9. Armed Response Officers
      10. CCTV and Control Rooms

  1. Technical References

Throughout this series, references are made to various standards for hardware specification and barrier construction. The following articles are provided as a technical reference to assist architects, engineers, and security professionals in interpreting these standards and/or evaluating the vulnerability of existing security barriers.

A. Forced Entry Standards
B. Ballistic Protection Standards
C. Protective Barrier Materials & Construction

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Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.
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Bullet Resistance Standards

Bullet Resistance Standards

The following article is provided as a technical reference to assist architects and security professionals in interpreting bullet-resistance standards and/or evaluating the vulnerability of existing  barrier materials. 

The most useful reference for specifying design and construction of bullet-resistant structural walls is U.S. Department of Defense UFC 4-023-07 (Design to Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects).[1] UFC 4-023-07 Table 5-3 provides guidance on the construction of structural barriers to resist four levels of ballistic threat. If a safe room designer uses 7.62x51mm NATO ammunition (or lesser caliber such as 5.56mm or 7.62x39mm) as the defined threat caliber, requirements would be defined by the ‘MEDIUM’ threat level category.[2]

UFC 4-023-07 also provides specifications on the minimum thickness of bullet-resistant fiberglass materials. However, a more reliable approach is to reference the performance data of specific fiberglass products as tested in accordance with industry standards.

Manufactured bullet-resistant products (e.g., doors, glazing, fiberglass panels, armor products, etc.) are normally tested and rated in accordance with several standards including UL 752, ASTM F1233-08, EN 1063, EN 1522, NIJ Standard-0101.06, and SD-STD-01.01.

In the United States, the two most common standards for specifying bullet-resistant building products are UL 752 and ASTM F1233-08. [3][4]

UL 752

UL 752 describes grades of ballistic resistance using ten levels encompassing weapon calibers ranging from 9mm handgun up to .50 caliber rifle plus an additional level for 12 gauge shotgun. The ammunition and number of shots the specimen resists (1, 3, or 5 shots) defines the Class Threat Level of the product. Under the UL 752 rating system, adequate specifications for protection against military small arms would define UL 752 Level 7 (5.56mm x 5 shots), Level 8 (7.62x51mm x 5 shots), or Level 9 (.30 caliber armor-piercing x 1 shot).

ASTM F1233-08

ASTM F1233-08 uses a scale of eleven Classes/Levels to describe the ballistic resistance of glazing systems. Under the ASTM F1233 rating system, specimens must successfully resist penetration by one or three shots from defined weapon calibers ranging from .38 cal up to .30-06 armor piercing ammunition and 12 gauge shotgun. Under the ASTM F1233 rating system­, specifications for protection against military small arms would define F1233 R1 (5.56mm x 3 shots), F1233 R3 (.308 Win./7.62x51mm x 3 shots), or F1233 R4-AP (.30-06 M2-AP x 1 shot).

NIJ Standard-0101.06

In the U.S., bullet-resistant body and vehicle armor are normally tested and classified according to NIJ Standard-0101.06.[5] The NIJ standard uses a six level type classification system to define protection levels. For classification under Types I through III, specimens must resist penetration by five shots according to the standard’s test procedure. Type IV armor products must resist a single shot by .30-06 armor-piercing ammunition. Although NIJ Standard-0101.06 is primarily designed for testing body armor, manufacturers of bullet-resistant building materials often test their products according to the NIJ standard in addition to others. If a security planner uses NIJ Standard-0101.06 for defining protection against military small arms, specifications should state a product classified as Type III (7.62mm x 5 shots) or Type IV.

SD-STD-01.01

All products rated under the U.S. Department of State standard SD-STD-01.01 have been tested against penetration by military small arms and shotguns.[6] The SD-STD-01.01 test procedure involves a minimum of nine shots by 5.56mm, 7.62x51mm, and 12 gauge buckshot in sequence against different target locations.

EN 1063

Outside North America, EN 1063 is one of the most common standards for rating bullet-resistant materials.[7] EN 1063 uses a seven-tiered scale to define ballistic protection from projectile weapons (BR classes) ranging from .22 cal. long rifle to 7.62x51mm hardcore ammunition and two additional levels to define protection against shotguns (SG class). Specimens rated under EN 1063 must resist penetration by three shots according to the standard’s test requirements. Under EN 1063, adequate specifications for protection against military small arms are BR5 (5.56mm), BR6 (7.62x51mm), or BR7 (7.62x51mm hard core).

EN 1522

Another European ballistic resistance standard is EN 1522  for windows, doors, shutters and blinds.[8] EN 1522 uses a seven level classification system to describe ballistic resistance by calibers ranging from .22 cal. long rifle to 7.62x51mm hardcore ammunition, and one additional level for 12/70 shotgun. The procedure described in EN 1522 requires that the specimen is subjected to three shots at various target points which are determined based upon the type of product under evaluation. For the purposes of specifying protection against military small arms, appropriate EN 1522 ratings include FB5 (5.56mm), FB6 (5.56mm and 7.62x51mm), and FB7 (7.62x51mm hard core).

The following table compares several common ballistic resistance standards and ratings applicable for protection against military small arms.

Ballistic Standards Chart

Other standards with potential use in specifying ballistic protection requirements in safe room design include:

    • NATO AEP-55 STANAG 4569
    • AS/NZS 2343:1997 Standard

Hold up for a moment…We mentioned 5.56mm, 7.62x51mm (NATO), .30-06 cal, and shotgun, but what about the most popular weapon used by terrorists worldwide–the Kalashnikov (7.62x39mm)?

With the exception of NATO’s STANAG 4569 and provisions for specially testing 7.62x39mm in European standards (e.g., EN 1522, etc.), none of the common standards for bullet-resistant products specifically addresses 7.62x39mm as a test caliber. It is safe to assume products successfully rated for protection against 7.62x51mm will be effective in stopping 7.62x39mm. It is well established that 7.62x51mm has better penetration capability than 7.62x39mm. Therefore, any product rated as/or greater than UL 752 Level 8, ASTM F1233 R3, NIJ Type III, EN 1063 BR6, or EN 1522 FB6 will be adequate for protection against 7.62x39mm weapons.

Many product manufacturers also claim that EN 1063 BR5 and UL 752 Level 7 are effective in resisting 7.62x39mm ball ammunition. Although there are significant differences in the ballistic properties of 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm ammunition, there are sources which indicate similar penetration capabilities.[9] However, I recommend requesting documented proof from manufacturers of successful 7.62x39mm testing for EN 1063 BR5 and UL 752 Level 7 products before relying on these rating levels.

[1] UFC 4-023-07, Design To Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects. US Department of Defense, N.p.: 2008.

[2] Ibid. pp. 2-1

[3] UL 752, Standard for Bullet-Resisting Equipment. UL, N.p.: 2005.

[4] ASTM F3038-14, Standard Test Method for Timed Evaluation of Forced-Entry-Resistant Systems, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, PA, 2014

[5] NIJ Standard-0101.06, Ballistic Resistance of Body Armor. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC, 2008.

[6] SD-STD-01.01, Revision G. Certification Standard. Forced Entry and Ballistic Resistance of Structural Systems. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Washington, DC, 1993.

[7] EN 1063:2000, Glass in building – Security glazing – Testing and classification of resistance against bullet attack. European Committee for Standardization, Brussels, 2000.

[8] EN 1522:1999, Windows, doors, shutters and blinds. Bullet resistance. Requirements and classification. European Committee for Standardization, Brussels, 1999.

[9] “5.56×45 versus 7.62×39 – Cartridge Comparison.” SWGGUN. SWGGUN, N.p. https://www.swggun.org/5-56-vs-7-62/. Accessed 22 Sept. 2017.

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.
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CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist organizations in managing risks of active shooter violence. 
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Mass Homicide in Schools: The Risk in Perspective

Mass Homicide in Schools - Risk Perspective

Mass Homicide in Schools: The Risk in Perspective

When teaching security planning workshops for school leaders, I find it valuable to begin the presentation with a brief discussion to put the risk of mass homicide in perspective. I realize in most audiences there will be a few administrators who believe such an event could never happen in their school. Conversely, I also know there may be others present holding an exaggerated fear of the threat fueled by what they have seen in headlines over the past several years.

There are two factors that contribute to risk: Probability (the likelihood of occurrence of a risk event) and Criticality (the impact/severity of the risk event). Statistically, acts of mass homicide in schools are very low in frequency and rarely does probability as a sole factor justify risk reduction. For instance, the FBI documented 52 active shooter attacks in the United States between 2000 and 2017 involving educational institutions.[1] [2] [3] Considering the presence of over 92,618 K-12 schools in the US, the estimated probability of an individual school experiencing an active shooter attack over the seventeen year reporting period is 0.0004.[4]

Active Shooter Attacks and Schools Infographic

However, the low statistical probability of active shooter risk rarely matches with public perspective. For instance, in a 2018 survey by Center for the Study of Local Issues at Anne Arundel Community College, 61% of county residents polled expressed fear of a mass shooting in local schools.[5] According to the 2018 PDK Poll of the Public’s Attitudes Toward Public Schools, 34% of parents reported fear for their child’s safety at school.[6] In a 2018 survey of Whatcom County public school parents, school security tied with topics of student support services and access to career and technical education opportunities as number one priorities.[7] For independent schools, security is rapidly eclipsing traditional priorities of parents (such as scholastic excellence) and perception of safety has even become an issue of business competition.

Psychologists attribute the public’s tendency to overestimate the probability of tragic events to a heuristic called availability bias.[8]  This phenomenon most commonly occurs as an inaccurate deviation in judgement in response to memorable and emotionally-impactful events.[9] In today’s society, this situation is often compounded by the extended duration and dramatic presentation of news media reporting in the aftermath of tragic school shootings.

Although the probability of mass homicide is indeed very low, the threat is real nonetheless. To punctuate this point during seminars, I end discussion about risk probability with a slide displaying Florida State University’s Strozer Library and a short description of the shooting on 20 November 2014. I use that specific event as a sober example of the reality of active shooter violence because my second oldest daughter had just departed the library twenty minutes before gunman Myron May arrived and commenced fire.

Strozer Library Shooting

Mass Homicide in Schools: Consequence as the deciding risk factor

For most schools, the probability of attack as a sole factor rarely justifies serious risk reduction. In most cases, it’s the potentially devastating consequences of an attack that warrant concern. Aside from the obvious and horrific impact of loss of life, active shooter attacks universally result in extended disruption of school operations, loss of student enrollments, and diversion of leadership attention to crisis management activities. The duration of disruption can extend months before police have released the school as a crime scene, cleanup and restoration is completed, and post-incident recovery activities have concluded.

An act of mass homicide can literally close the doors on a school forever. In cases where the horror of the event is deeply imprinted into the psyche of the public, the school may be deemed permanently inhabitable due to its presence as a reminder of the tragedy. Rather than repair and restore Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newtown Public Schools opted to demolish the building and build a new replacement school at an estimated cost of $50M.[10] Similarly, Florida’s Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act authorized $25 million to replace building 12 in Parkland, Florida.

Depending the school’s responsiveness in managing the post-incident psychological consequences, the effects of an attack can easily result in exodus of students and school employees and long-term negative impact on climate and culture. In addition to psychological wounds suffered by the school population, the trauma of mass homicide can extend far beyond the local community with measurable effects of sadness and anxiety experienced vicariously by people nationwide.[11]

When these issues are rationally and objectively viewed from the perspective of risk, it is usually the combined results of duty of care obligation (legal and moral responsibility for student safety), parental perceptions and expectations, and the potentially catastrophic consequences of an attack that warrant a balanced and diligent approach to risk control in schools.

[1] UFC 4-023-07, Design To Resist Direct Fire Weapons Effects. US Department of Defense, N.p.: 2008.

[2] Ibid. pp. 2-1

[3] UL 752, Standard for Bullet-Resisting Equipment. UL, N.p.: 2005.

[4] ASTM F3038-14, Standard Test Method for Timed Evaluation of Forced-Entry-Resistant Systems, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, PA, 2014

[5] NIJ Standard-0101.06, Ballistic Resistance of Body Armor. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC, 2008.

[6] SD-STD-01.01, Revision G. Certification Standard. Forced Entry and Ballistic Resistance of Structural Systems. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Washington, DC, 1993.

[7] EN 1063:2000, Glass in building – Security glazing – Testing and classification of resistance against bullet attack. European Committee for Standardization, Brussels, 2000.

[8] EN 1522:1999, Windows, doors, shutters and blinds. Bullet resistance. Requirements and classification. European Committee for Standardization, Brussels, 1999.

[9] “5.56×45 versus 7.62×39 – Cartridge Comparison.” SWGGUN. SWGGUN, N.p. https://www.swggun.org/5-56-vs-7-62/. Accessed 22 Sept. 2017.

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.
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Copyright © 2019 by Craig S. Gundry, PSP, cATO, CHS-III

CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist schools in managing risks of active shooter violence.  Contact us for more information.

References

[1] Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents 2000-2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 2014.

[2] Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 2016.

[3] Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2016 and 2017, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 2018.

[4] U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2018). Digest of Education Statistics, 2016 (NCES 2017-094), Chapter 2.

[5] County Survey Finds Support for Gun Control, Concerns About Mass Shooting at Schools. Press Release: April 5, 2018. Center for the Study of Local Issues, Anne Arundel Community College.

[6] School security: Is your child safe at school? – PDK Poll 2018. http://pdkpoll.org/results/school-security-is-your-child-safe-at-school

[7] OSPI NEWS RELEASE: Counseling, Mental Health Top Priority, Public Says. Washington Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction. August 28, 2018.

[8] Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel (1973). “Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability”. Cognitive Psychology. 5 (2): 207–232.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Delgadillo, Natalie. With Shootings on the Rise, Schools Turn to ‘Active Shooter’ Insurance. http://www.governing.com/topics/education/gov-cost-of-active-shooters-insurance.html. June 2018.

[11] Dore, B., Ort, L., Braverman, O., & Ochsner, K. N. (2015). Sadness shifts to anxiety over time and distance from the national tragedy in Newtown, Connecticut. Psychological Science, 26(4), 363–373.

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School Security Training Webinar for Independent School Leaders

School Security Training Webinar for Independent School Leaders

The following series of school security training videos is produced as a webinar edition of the one-day Integrated Security Planning for School Administrators (ISPSA) seminar as presented for independent school organizations and John Jay College of Criminal Justice. The ISPSA webinar series explores a full spectrum of school security training topics including risk management strategy and planning, safe school climate and culture, school threat assessment, physical security and facility design, emergency response planning, and more.

The ISPSA webinar program presents a comprehensive and holistic approach to school security and emergency readiness in alignment with the principles of the CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program®.

ISPSA Video 01/04 – Security Risk Management & Safe School Climate

 In this one-hour lesson, architect of the CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® Craig Gundry explores the dynamics of mass homicide in schools, risk management strategy, and establishing a safe school climate and culture as the first layer of defense against active shooter attacks.

Risk Management & School Security ….1:32

— Mass Homicide in Schools: The Risk in Perspective….1:32

— Characteristics of Active Shooters in Schools….6:54

— Security Risk Management Strategy….10:51

— Anatomy of a School Attack….17:12

— Adversary Applicability and Risk Management….20:43

Safe School Climate and Culture….23:10

— School Leadership and Strategic Planning….28:16

— Knowing Your Students….31:51

— Fostering a Positive School Culture….35:28

— Positive Disciplinary Practices….38:11

— Reconciling Security Measures and School Climate….40:25

—– SRO & Security Officer Impact on School Climate….43:11

— Educating Parents….53:13

ISPSA Video 02/04 – Student Threat Assessment & Management

In this 1.25-hour lesson, architect of the CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® Craig Gundry explores the pathway to targeted violence in schools, threat assessment principles, and approaches to managing student behavior of concern.

Psychology of Targeted Violence….0:03:10

— Types of Aggression….0:03:10

— Pathway Model of Targeted Violence and Schools….0:09:09

Threat Assessment Methodology….0:13:09

— Behavior of Concern and Threat Reporting….0:14:08

— Overview of Threat Assessment Process….0:16:50

— Salem-Keizer Threat Assessment Process….0:18:36

— CIS Threat Assessment Process….0:22:32

— CSTAG Threat Assessment Process….0:24:54

— FERPA & Threat Assessment….0:31:54

— Parental Cooperation….0:33:54

Key Assessment Factors….41:20

— Warning Behaviors….0:42:17

— Risk Factors….0:58:45

— Stabilizing Factors….1:08:04

— Estimating Threat….1:09:14

Threat Management Options….1:12:41

ISPSA Video 03/04 – Physical Security and School Facility Design

In this two-hour lesson module, architect of the CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® Craig Gundry explores important aspects of physical security and access control in schools, life safety design, and response to imminent threat situations.

Principles of Performance-Based Physical Security….0:01:14

— Physical Protection System (PPS) Functions and Schools….0:02:39

— Physical Protection Systems and Active Shooter Attacks….0:05:08

— PPS Performance and Historical Case Examples….0:08:07

— Physical Security and Active Shooters….0:14:00

Perimeter Protection and School Grounds….0:17:14

— Campus Fencing….0:17:20

—- Cost-Benefit and Case Examples….0:22:01

—- Campus Fencing & Egress Gates….0:25:38

— Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design….0:28:10

— Obscuration….0:30:30

— Outdoor Intrusion and Attack Detection….0:32:19

—- Gunshot Detection Systems….0:32:46

School Building Façade and Entrances….0:34:59

— Façade Glazing….0:35:21

—- Protective Glazing Options….0:42:12

— Entry Control…0:49:14

—- Secure Lobby Design….0:50:41

—- Contraband and Weapons Screening….0:54:55

— Campus Access Control Systems….1:06:52

—- Lockdown Macro Events….1:09:06

—- Examples of Access Control Applications….1:11:03

—- Access Control Locking Hardware….1:16:40

Secure Classrooms….1:24:38

— Classroom Door Locks….1:29:04

— Windows & Door Vision Panels….1:34:27

Ballistic Protection….1:34:58

Emergency Exits and Egress Obstructions….1:40:50

Armed Response Force Deployment….1:44:22

— SRO & Security Officer Selection….1:46:21

— SRO & Security Officer Training….1:50:14

— SRO & Security Officer Post Assignment….1:54:20

— Armed Teachers and Staff Members?….1:54:42

—- Considerations for Armed School Staff….2:00:48

Practical Integration of Performance-Based Physical Security….2:05:35

ISPSA Video 04/04 – Emergency Response Planning and Preparation

In this 2.25-hour lesson module, architect of the CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® Craig Gundry explores characteristics of effective emergency response plans, infrastructure preparations, and model procedures for responding to school emergencies.

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.

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CIS Guardian SafeSchool consultants offer a range of services to assist schools in managing risks of active shooter violence.  Contact us for more information.

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The School Security Plan: A Holistic Approach

School Security Plan - A Holistic Approach

The School Security Plan: A Holistic Approach

Effective school security plans begin with a strategy. To most, this sounds like an obvious point. However, some of the most common problems I encounter as a consultant are the absence of cohesive strategy in the design of school security plans and over reliance on a limited set of protective measures.

Fundamentally, preparation for active shooter violence is a process of risk management and conceptually no different from any other security and safety planning activity. The ultimate aim of any risk management program is to effectively characterize the risk to an organization’s assets and implement measures to reduce risk in alignment with the organization’s risk appetite while tending matters of operational needs, culture, branding, and budget.

An effective school security plan employs a combined approach to reducing risk probability and risk criticality. In the context of security risk, probability is the result of Threat (an adversary with intent and capability to cause harm) and Vulnerability (the state of conditions that would allow the adversary to succeed in causing the risk event). Proactive security measures aim to reduce Risk Probability by either reducing Threat or reducing Vulnerability. If proactive measures are implemented effectively, they may be successful in reducing Risk Probability, but there is always an element of uncertainty. To further reduce risk, reactive/mitigative measures are employed to reduce the harmful effect of risk events (Risk Criticality).

The School Security Plan & Multi-Layered Risk Management

In protective theory, this concept of multiple layers of proactive and mitigative measures is often described as concentric rings of protection. This concept is illustrated in the following diagram. The outermost rings of the diagram (colored in blue) represent proactive measures aimed at reducing probability by reducing Threat and/or Vulnerability. However, despite our best effort to mitigate the probability of active shooter attacks, no strategy to prevent events can guarantee success with certainty. To address this reality, additional preparations should be implemented to reduce the severity of attack events. Additional mitigative and reactive countermeasures are represented by the innermost red layers in the diagram below.

Risk Management and Security Strategy for Schools

In the context of school security planning, proactive risk management starts with reducing potential threat. This is first accomplished by reducing the potential conditions that contribute to advancement on the targeted violence pathway. Reinforcement of positive school culture, creating strong bonds between staff and students, mentoring students with problems, actively intervening in bullying situations, and restorative practices are all examples of measures aimed at reducing threat. Additionally, as promoted by the US Government’s Safe School initiative in 2000-2002, having a formal system in place to identify potential threats and warning behaviors, investigate and assess threats, and manage potential threatening situations before they result in violence is another critical element of reducing threat.

Positive school culture and threat assessment may be effective in reducing the threat of students escalating toward violence, but these measures have little effect on outsider adversaries who may target the school for reasons beyond the school’s influence. The only way to effectively mitigate probability in this risk situation is to establish an effective physical protection system. Effective physical security requires that a threat is detected early and delayed from accomplishing the objective long enough for a response force to intercept. If these three elements (Detection, Delay, and Response) are deficient or out of synch, the system will fail. In virtually every school attack perpetrated by an outsider (e.g., MSDHS, Sandy Hook, West Nickel Mines, Platte River Canyon, etc.), there was a major failure in one or more of these three key functional elements. As of present, very few schools in the United States have a physical security program that truly meets the criteria for performance effectiveness.

If an attack does occur, an effective school security plan integrates additional measures to mitigate the impact of the risk event. In school security, this starts by having a response force capable of effectively intercepting a threat before they can cause mass violence. If the effective response time of local police is longer than three minutes, it is usually impractical, if not impossible, to achieve enough delay time to prevent mass tragedy. Unfortunately, average police response times (effective response times) during active shooter events often range between 7 and 10 minutes (depending on cited source). The only way to guarantee an effective and reliable response is to have a reliable alert and communications system and an on-site response capability provided by School Resource Officers or well-trained armed security officers.

In addition to communications and tactical response, plans and preparations should be emplaced to manage the situation safely, effectively, and restore normal operations as quickly as possible. This starts with an effective and well-organized school emergency response plan. Despite the importance of having a solid and integrated emergency plan, this is one area where many schools have problems. School emergency plans are often a collection of memos with little integration or effective consideration to issues such as redundancy, feasibility under high stress conditions, and the many faces of “Murphy’s law” that emerge during crisis management.

Once the foundation is laid through effective response planning, teachers and faculty need to be trained in their functions and regularly drilled in response procedures. One of our clients, Shorecrest Preparatory School, conducts lockdown drills bi-monthly to ensure that teachers and staff members are instinctive in their response. When questioned about the frequency of lockdown drills versus legally-mandated fire drills, Mike Murphy (Headmaster at Shorecrest Prep) tells people that no kids have been killed in school fires in over 50 years but one only needs to watch this week’s news to be reminded of the last time school children were killed in an act of violence.

The Guardian SafeSchool Program® as a Model for Best Practices

The CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® integrates all of these approaches to managing safety and security in schools while reinforcing school climate and culture. Our philosophy behind the design of the program is a holistic and multi-layered strategy that reduces risk by preventing acts of violence and mitigating the potential impact of events through effective preparation and response.

CIS is honored that John Jay College of Criminal Justice has peer reviewed the program and endorsed it as a model for best practices. It is our hope that states, school districts, and private schools will consider the methodology described in his article as they search for an effective and balanced solution to reducing risks of targeted violence while simultaneously fostering environments conducive to good education.

For more information about school security planning, protective strategy, and measures for reducing negative impact on school climate and culture, see the YouTube video at the bottom of the page.

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.
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CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist schools in managing risks of active shooter violence.  Contact us for more information.

References

 

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Risk Management & Workplace Violence

Risk Management and Workplace Violence

Risk Management & Workplace Violence

By Craig S. Gundry, PSP, cATO, CHS-III

Workplace Violence: The Risk in Perspective

By comparison to many other security risks, workplace violence incidents are low-moderate frequency events and rarely result in lethal consequences. According to US labor statistics, workplace violence is only responsible for 18% of deaths in professional office and healthcare settings—less than transportation accidents or even slips and falls.[i] Nevertheless, nearly 2 million American workers report having been victims of workplace violence each year.[ii] For reasons of liability, productivity, and duty of care, it is important that all employers implement reasonable measures to mitigate the probability and impact of workplace violence incidents.

Most incidents of workplace violence are examples of impromptu violence, spontaneous and unplanned acts of aggression often happening in the heat of the moment.[iii] These types of incidents can range from verbal threats and oral abuse all the way up the continuum of aggression to physical assault and non-premeditated murder.

Of greatest concern from a risk management perspective are acts of intended violence (also referred to as ‘targeted aggression’) which result in a planned, premeditated act.[iv] Most acts of mass homicide in workplace environments are examples of targeted violence and result from progression on a ‘pathway’ of development over time.

Mass Homicide in the Workplace

Many individuals who perpetrate mass violence align with Dr. Park Dietz’s definition of a Pseudocommando.[v] Pseudocommandos often evolve from angry, narcissistic personalities and harbor perceived injustices as a grievance for revenge. Violent fantasies become a refuge for the pseudocommando’s damaged ego and provide a sense of power and control.[vi] Without intervention, this process may continue into obsession and escalate until violent fantasy becomes a template for action. If this pathway progression continues unabated until nihilism takes place, commitment to violence is affirmed and often commenced in a planned manner or initiated by a trigger event (e.g., termination, demotion, family crisis, etc.).[vii]

By contrast to other security threats and even incidents of impromptu violence, acts of mass homicide are extremely low in frequency and rarely does probability as a sole factor justify risk reduction. In most cases, it’s the potentially devastating consequences of an attack that warrant concern. Aside from the obvious and horrific impact of loss of life, active assailant attacks universally result in extended disruption of facility operations, loss due to reduced productivity, and diversion of leadership attention to crisis management. The duration of operational disruption can span months before police release the facility as a crime scene, cleanup and remediation are completed, and post-incident recovery activities have concluded.

In cases where the horror of the event is deeply imprinted into the psyche of the public, the facility may be deemed permanently inhabitable due to its presence as a reminder of the tragedy. Rather than repair and restore Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newtown Public Schools opted to demolish the building and build a new replacement school at an estimated cost of $50M.[viii] Similarly, Florida’s Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act authorized $25 million to replace building 12 in Parkland, Florida. In the aftermath of the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting, the owner decided to permanently close the business as a nightclub and rebuild the site as a memorial and museum.

Depending on the organization’s responsiveness in managing the post-incident psychological consequences, the effects of an attack can easily result in an exodus of employees and long-term negative impact on workplace culture. In addition to psychological wounds suffered by victims of attacks, the trauma of mass violence can extend far beyond the local community with measurable effects of sadness and anxiety experienced vicariously by people nationwide.[ix]

When all risk factors are assessed in context, it is often the combined results of duty of care obligation (i.e., legal and moral responsibility for occupant safety), community perceptions and expectations, and the potentially catastrophic consequences of an event that warrant a balanced and diligent approach to risk control.

Risk Management Strategy and Workplace Violence

Effective risk management programs employ a multi-layered approach to controlling risk by reducing both the Probability and Criticality of events.

In the context of security risk management, risk probability is the result of Threat (an adversary with intent and capability to cause harm) and Vulnerability (the state of conditions that would allow the adversary to succeed in causing the risk event). Proactive measures aim to reduce Risk Probability by either reducing Threat or reducing Vulnerability. If proactive measures are implemented effectively, they may be successful in reducing Risk Probability, but there is always an element of uncertainty. To further reduce risk, reactive/mitigative measures should be employed to reduce the harmful effect of risk events (Risk Criticality).

In protective design theory, this concept of employing multiple layers of proactive and mitigative measures aimed at risk reduction is often described as concentric rings of protection. The following diagram illustrates this concept as it relates to workplace violence. The outermost rings of the diagram (colored in blue) represent proactive measures aimed at reducing risk probability. This is then followed by inner rings (red) representing mitigative measures aimed at decreasing the impact of events.

Workplace Violence Prevention Program

Workplace Violence Prevention (Proactive Measures)

Proactive risk management starts with reducing potential Threat. As a first step, measures should be employed where feasible to reduce the likely presence of violent perpetrators. One example is subjecting applicants to criminal record checks and carefully screening candidates for indications of previous behavioral problems. Next, measures should be employed to reduce potential conditions that contribute to the formation of violent intent or progression on the pathway of targeted violence. Measures such as reinforcement of positive workplace culture, providing access to employee assistance programs, and using management practices that reinforce employee dignity all contribute to reducing potential threat.

Other threat reduction measures aimed at reducing the likelihood of violence by nonemployees (e.g., angry customers, criminals, etc.) include training personnel in conflict de-escalation, ‘do-not-admit’ and trespass of threatening patrons, and presence of visible security measures as a deterrent to aggressive behavior.

To address the possibility of a dangerous employee already within our midst, threat assessment and management is our next line of defense. Extensive research over the past 25 years has established that most acts of targeted aggression by employees are precipitated by behaviors that if recognized and properly assessed can warn of potential violence and provide opportunity for intervention. Effective implementation of threat assessment and management as a protective strategy requires establishing a system for investigating and assessing threats, training supervisors to identify behaviors of concern, and managing potentially threatening situations before they result in violence.

If an employee of concern is terminated, procedures should be employed to ensure the safety of staff and best alleviate potential grievance. Some examples of safety measures include conducting the termination in a manner that preserves the individual’s dignity, scheduling terminations in the late afternoon, having security nearby, and avoiding early warning or breaks which provide an opportunity for retrieving a weapon. If concerns are substantial, additional measures may be justified such as severance pay or surveillance over the following weeks to monitor the ex-employee’s behavior and warn/intervene if the individual travels to the facility without an appointment.

Consequence Management and Workplace Violence

The aforementioned measures are often effective in reducing the probability of violence. But if measures employed to prevent attacks are unsuccessful or someone targets the facility in a manner that evades our proactive influence, physical security becomes the next line of defense. In the case of a convenience store, this may simply mean the installation of bullet-resistant glazing at the checkout counter. For organizations at risk of active assailant attacks, effective physical security is paramount in reducing the overall consequences of the event.

For best performance, physical security design should integrate Detection, Delay, and Response elements in a manner that mathematically reconciles the time required for an attacker to commence mass killing and the time required for detection and response by security or police.

If an event does occur, additional measures should be implemented to mitigate the impact of the risk event. This includes items such as early event detection and alert communications, emergency response plans and employee training, effective provisions for egress/escape, availability of safe refuge rooms, and the expedited response of armed security or police officers capable of effectively neutralizing an attacker before he/she can cause mass casualties.

Risk Management and Adversary Applicability

Obviously, not all risk reduction measures are equally applicable to all situations. Measures that may be necessary and justified in an office environment are often quite different from those in settings such as retail stores or hospitals. Risk management strategy should focus on relevant workplace violence risks in a manner that satisfies the organization’s risk appetite while tending matters of operational needs, culture, branding, and budget.

Below is a table describing the general relevance of measures in reducing different types of workplace violence risks using the FBI’s four-category classification system:.[x] 

    • Type I – Violent acts by criminals who have no other connection with the workplace, but enter to commit robbery or another crime.
    • Type II – Violence directed at employees by customers, clients, patients, students, inmates, or any others for whom an organization provides services.
    • Type III – Violence against coworkers, supervisors, or managers by a present or former employee.
    • Type IV – Violence committed in the workplace by someone who doesn’t work there, but has a personal relationship with an employee—an abusive spouse or domestic partner.
Workplace Violence Prevention Measures

ANSI/ASIS Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention Standard as a Guide for Best Practices

For those seeking to develop or improve a workplace violence prevention program, the newly updated ASIS/ANSI Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention Standard is a great place to start. The ASIS/ANSI standard (formerly ASIS/SHRM WVP.1-2011) “provides an overview of policies, processes, and protocols that organizations can adopt to help identify, assess, respond to and mitigate threatening or intimidating behavior and violence affecting the workplace.”[xi]

The measures outlined in the standard are largely universal and can be adapted to organizations of almost any size. Some of the items addressed include the role and responsibilities of stakeholders, needs assessment, elements of policy, threat assessment and management practices, critical incident planning, employee training, and more.

In early 2020, a multi-disciplinary committee of experts completed a two-year review and revision of ASIS/SHRM WVP.1-2011 including the addition of a new Active Assailant Annex. In an upcoming article, we’ll explore some of the key measures outlined in the standard and differences between the updated document and the previous edition.

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.
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Copyright © 2019 by Craig S. Gundry, PSP, cATO, CHS-III

CIS consultants offer a range of services to assist organizations in managing risks of workplace aggression and active shooter violence.  Contact us for more information.

References

[i] Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI). Bureau of Labor Statistics. N.p. 2015. | Cited percentage of 18% is derived from analysis of 2015 workplace fatalities for NAICS categories Health care and social assistance, Professional and business services, and Professional and technical services

[ii] Workplace Violence Overview. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. US Department of Labor. N.p. https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/. Accessed 25 October 2017.

[iii] Calhoun, Fredrick, and Weston, Stephen. Threat Assessment and Management Strategies: Identifying the Hunters and the Howlers. CRC Press. Boca Raton, FL. 2016. pp 25.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Dietz, Park D. “Mass, Serial, and Sensational Homicides.” Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine.  62:49-91. 1986.

[vi] Meloy, J. Reid, and Hoffman, Jens. International Handbook of Threat Assessment. Oxford University Press. New York, NY. 2014.

[vii] Knoll, James. L. “The “Pseudocommando” Mass Murderer: Part II, The Language of Revenge.” The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. 38:263–72, 2010

[viii] Delgadillo, Natalie. With Shootings on the Rise, Schools Turn to ‘Active Shooter’ Insurance. http://www.governing.com/topics/education/gov-cost-of-active-shooters-insurance.html. June 2018.

[ix] Dore, B., Ort, L., Braverman, O., & Ochsner, K. N. (2015). Sadness shifts to anxiety over time and distance from the national tragedy in Newtown, Connecticut. Psychological Science, 26(4), 363–373.

[X] Workplace Violence. Issues in Response. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. N.d.

[xi] ASIS/SHRM WVP.1-2011, Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention. 2011.

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The MSDHS Commission Report – A Security Expert’s Critique (1/2)

MSDHS Public Safety Commission Report
By Craig S. Gundry, PSP, cATO, CHS-III

On 02 January 2019, the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (MSDHS) Public Safety Commission released its initial report detailing the February 2018 tragedy at MSD High School and system failures contributing to the event. Appendix B. of the report (“Target Hardening,” pages 345-350) describes proposed measures for improved security and emergency readiness in Florida schools.

The Commission’s new report follows a previous briefing released in November 2018 where target hardening measures under consideration were first presented to the public. In December, CIS submitted a critique to the Commission regarding proposed measures under consideration with the intention of correcting a number of inaccurate statements, important omissions, and a few dangerous recommendations. To the credit of the MSDHS Public Safety Commission, several of the problems described in our previous submission to the Commission have been remedied in the new report. 

Nevertheless, a number of our original concerns remain unaddressed. Although Critical Intervention Services applauds the State’s commitment to improved school security and the great effort of the MSDHS Public Safety Commission, it is our hope that spotlighting these outstanding issues will better aid Florida schools in adopting the Commission’s recommendations while avoiding potential problems resulting from the Commission’s oversight.

Concerns Regarding MSDHS ‘Hardening’ Recommendations

Following is a summary of outstanding concerns regarding physical security measures recommended in the MSDHS Public Safety Commission report.

As a Level I measure, page 345 states: “Campuses should have single ingress and egress points to the extent that is consistent with this level’s criteria of minimal cost.” As a Level II measure, page 347 states: “Fenced campuses with single ingress and egress points (could be a level III based on campus size and complexity).”

Although CIS recommends channeling access into secured campuses through a limited number of monitored entry points, the MSDHS Public Safety Commission report provides very concerning advice by recommending there be only a single egress point.

In this situation, students located outdoors during an attack are trapped unless they climb a fence to escape or encircle a campus perimeter to access a single egress point. By contrast, students located outdoors during an attack should have easy access to egress gates located abundantly around the campus perimeter. This is a very common oversight we encounter in our work as consultants with schools that have implemented fenced perimeters.

To address concerns about the exploitation of outdoor egress gates as points of entry, outdoor gates should feature mechanical exit bars and anti-manipulation features (e.g, screen mesh, acrylic panel, etc.). Exit bars featuring audible alarms can also be used to discourage exit during non-emergency situations and alert nearby staff if a student departs the campus. See the photo right as an example.

In contrast to the Commission’s advice, CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® standards recommend abundant and versatile access to secure outdoor egress gates.
Secure Egress Gate

Page 347 states: “All common use closed areas in a school must have electronically controlled doors that can be locked remotely or locally with appropriate hardware on single and double doors to resist forced entry.”

Although CIS strongly endorses the use of electronic access control systems in schools, caution should be used in the selection of hardware and system configuration to avoid creating new vulnerabilities and operational problems. Regretfully, the MSDHS Public Safety Commission report does not provide guidance about access-controlled hardware selection and system configuration.

As one example of this concern, schools should strictly avoid the use of electromagnetic locks on egress doors. Building and life safety codes universally require that egress doors equipped with electromagnetic locks ‘fail safe’ (unlocked) during fire alarms.[1]  In this situation, all fire alarm pull stations inside the school are ‘virtual master keys’ and would compromise most doors if someone activated a pull handle. In a number of previous attacks, fire alarms were manually activated by building occupants to alert others (e.g., 2013 Washington Navy Yard), activated by smoke or dust (e.g., 2018 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, 2008 Taj Majal Hotel Mumbai, etc.), or used by adversaries to deceptively herd victims outdoors for ambush (e.g., 1998 Westside Middle School, 2013 UCF, 2015 Corinthia Hotel Tripoli, etc.).  Conversely, when an alarm is not activated, electromagnetic locks require a push-to-exit switch or sensor to unlock egress doors when approached.  In tests conducted by CIS, both methods of unlocking are often unreliable when people attempt egress under high stress conditions.

CIS strongly recommends that the MSDHS Public Safety Commission provide more detailed guidance for schools to aid with proper selection of access-controlled hardware and system configuration. (NOTE: We will be posting a new article soon to address this matter comprehensively.)

As an additional recommendation about access control, report page 349 states as a Level III measure: “RFID and Near field communications (NFC) card readers should replace all door locks on campus.”

Although RFID and NFC access control systems offer great versatility and can be very useful for controlling access into school buildings, CIS strongly discourages the use of card readers and electrified locks on classrooms which may be used as safe rooms during attacks. If the access control system in the school employs card readers and an assailant recovers an access badge from a fallen staff member, all doors with programmed access will be compromised. The report’s recommendation, as written, also contradicts other statements in Appendix B. advising that door locks be installed on all classrooms that can be locked from the inside.

CIS advises that Florida schools restrict use of access-controlled locks to exterior doors, reception lobbies, and hallway doors separating interior classroom wings.

Regarding classroom doors, page 346 states: “All classroom doors should be able to be locked from inside or there must be an enforced policy that all doors remain locked at all times without exception.” Regarding events at MSDHS High School, page 45 the report states: “Individual classroom door locks could only be locked from outside the door. The teacher would have to exit their classroom and use a key to lock the door. There was no way to lock the door from within the classroom.” The related findings on page 47 state: “All of the classroom doors in Building 12 could only be locked from the exterior. Teachers inconsistently locked classroom doors and some doors were unlocked the day of the shooting. Teachers were reluctant to enter the halls to lock the doors.”

Although CIS is encouraged to see the Commission addressing concerns about standard ANSI “classroom-function” door locks, the report only addresses the matter of locking the door from the hallway-side and does not advise against locks which require a key for locking. As witnessed in a number of shooting events, doors equipped with classroom-function locks often remain unlocked due to difficulty locating or manipulating keys under stress. Some examples of incidents where this situation clearly contributed to unnecessary casualties include the 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary shooting and 2007 Virginia Tech attack. In those two events alone, 26 students and faculty were killed and 24 wounded specifically because their doors could not be secured once the attack was in progress. [ii] [iii] Another recent example of an unlocked classroom due to a missing key occurred during the December 2017 shooting at Aztec High School.[iv]

The limited recommendations provided in the Commission’s report would make “classroom security function” locks (ANSI mortise F09/bored F88) permissible in Florida schools.  Classroom security function locks can be locked from inside the classroom, but still require a key for locking.

CIS strongly advises against the use of all locks classified by ANSI as “classroom function.” CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® standards recommend ANSI/BHMA A156 Grade 1 locks with an ANSI lock code of F04 or F82 (office function).[v] Mechanical locks rated ANSI/BHMA Grade 1 have been successfully evaluated under a variety of static force and torque tests.  Locks coded as F04 and F82 feature buttons or thumbturns to facilitate ease of locking under stress.

As a Level I measure, page 346 states: “Classroom doors should either have no windows or every door should be equipped with a device that can readily block line of sight through the window, but does not indicate occupancy…First floor outside windows should be able to be blocked from line of sight.” As a Level III measure, page 348 states: “Install ballistic resistant glass covering on classroom interior door windows… Install classroom door windows that are small enough to restrict access and located a sufficient distance from the door handle to prevent a person from reaching through to unlock the door from the interior.”

Although these measures are sound in principle, there are several concerns with the Commission’s recommendations as presented in the report. First, the MSDHS Public Safety Commission report only recommends ballistic resistant glass on door “windows” and makes little mention about the intrusion-resistance of door vision panels, classroom hallway windows, and first floor glazing. Although it would be ideal if door vision panels were protected by ballistic-resistant glazing, such recommendations are impractical in installation and very difficult to justify from a cost-benefit perspective. A more practical and critical objective (which often can be addressed without significant expense) is delaying and deterring adversaries from breaching windows to enter occupied spaces.

According to testing documented by Sandia National Laboratories, 0.25 inch tempered glass provides 3-9 seconds of delay against an intruder using a fire axe and the mean delay time for penetrating 1/8″ tempered glass with a hammer is 0.5 minutes.[vi]  However, impact testing documented by Sandia did not account for the fragility of a tempered glass specimen after first being penetrated by firearm projectile. In penetration tests Critical Intervention Services conducted of 1/4-inch tempered glass windows using several shots from a 9mm handgun to penetrate glazing prior to impact by hand, delay time was only 10 seconds.[vii] This vulnerability was exploited by Adam Lanza during his entry into Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012.[viii]

Active Shooter Tempered Glass

Some practical options for upgrading existing window glazing include laminated glass, polycarbonate (for door vision panel replacement), and reinforcing existing windows with properly attached anti-shatter film. All the aforementioned options can increase the delay time performance of windows by 90 seconds or more against firearm-aided forced entry.

We strongly advise Florida schools to adopt the Guardian SafeSchool Program® standards regarding glazing and prioritize upgrade of any vulnerable tempered glass vision panels, classroom hallway windows, and first floor exterior classroom glazing prior to the Commission’s recommendations of ballistic resistant door windows.

The following is a summary of essential protective measures for classrooms suitable for refuge during imminent threat situations.

Active Shooter Safe Room Classroom Design

As a Level II measure, page 347 recommends: “Use protective bollards at campus entrances.”

Although anti-vehicle barriers are an effective measure to reduce the risk of vehicle ramming as a means of attack or entry, vehicle ramming has been historically rare inside the United States by comparison to other forced entry and attack techniques. This fact is also pointed out in the Commission’s report on page 14: “Vehicles have been used as weapons in terror attacks including one attack against students at a university in the US.  No vehicles were used in any of the K-12 school attacks.” When approached from a cost-benefit perspective, funds allocated to installing bollards would often be better applied in addressing more critical vulnerabilities (e.g., glazing, locks, etc.).

As another matter, the effectiveness of bollards largely depends on their kinetic energy tolerance in relation to the energy generated upon vehicle impact (determined by vehicle mass and approach velocity).[ix]  This issue should be carefully assessed in any situation where bollards are installed to ensure performance as expected.

If the objective of bollards is to prevent forced entry into a protected campus, requirements for utility vehicle access will also require schools to install crash-rated active barricades at vehicle gates to ensure complete protection. Specification standards relevant to active anti-vehicle barricades include ASTM F-2656-07 and/or IWA 14-1.[x]  However, the price of crash-rated anti-vehicle barricades is likely far beyond the budget of most schools.

CIS recommends that Florida schools downgrade the priority of installing bollards until all other critical security improvements are completed. The unique exception to this general advice would be the protection of playgrounds located near roads and parking lots.

Continued in Part Two

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry

Craig Gundry is the Vice President of Special Projects for Critical Intervention Services and an instructor on advanced security topics for the S2 Institute. As a consultant, Mr. Gundry specializes in managing risks of mass homicide (e.g., terrorism, active shooter violence, etc.) and has assisted clients around the world in improving their security and emergency readiness programs.
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Copyright © 2019 by Craig S. Gundry, PSP, cATO, CHS-III

CIS Guardian SafeSchool Program® consultants offer a range of services to assist schools in managing risks of active shooter violence. Contact us for more information.

References

[1] International Code Council. International Building Code, 2012. Country Club Hills, IL: International Code Council, 2011.

[ii] Sedensky, Stephen J. Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012. Danbury, Ct.: Office of the State’s Attorney. Judicial District of Danbury, 2013. Print.

[iii] Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech. April 16, 2007. Report of the Review Panel. Virginia Tech Review Panel. August 2007. pp.13.

[iv] Matthews, Justin. “Substitute unable to lock doors during shooting.” KOAT Action News. 9 December 2017. http://www.koat.com/article/substitute-unable-to-lock-doors-during-shooting/14399571. Accessed 17 December 2017.

[v] ANSI/BHMA A156.13, Mortise Locks and Latches. Builders Hardware Manufacturers Association (BHMA), New York, NY, 2011.

[vi] Barrier Technology Handbook, SAND77-0777. Sandia Laboratories, 1978. pp. 16.3-39

[vii] Critical Intervention Services assisted window film manufacturer Solar Gard Saint-Gobain in 2015 in conducting a series of timed penetration tests of unprotected tempered glass windows and glazing reinforced with anti-shatter film. The author personally supervised and witnessed these tests.

[viii] Sedensky, Stephen J. Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012. Danbury, Ct.: Office of the State’s Attorney. Judicial District of Danbury, 2013. Print.

[ix] UFC 4-022-02, SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF VEHICLE BARRIERS. US Department of Defense, N.p.: 2010.

[x] Guide to Active Vehicle Barrier (AVB) Specification and Selection Resources. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2016.

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